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Welcome to the inaugural issue of CTX - Combating Terrorism Exchange!   
Welcome to the inaugural issue of CTX - Combating Terrorism Exchange! 
We are the very first journal built from the ground up exclusively for the CTFP 
community, which has grown to over 160 countries, and has thousands of 
participants serving in the  military, government, and private and academic sectors.  
"CTFP" stands for Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and that's right, if you 
are receiving this, then you are, in some way, a part of this powerful network. 
  With headlines like "Greek Police Arrest Turkish Terror Suspect Wanted 
In Germany" earlier last month, the need for us to come together to address the 
issues of terrorism has become more apparent and pressing than ever.  We hope 
CTX will inspire you to work with your international colleagues by sharing stories 
with others who are working in the field to implement cooperative, effective 
strategies against terrorism - uniting multiple nations, and multiple sectors of 
society. 
  The 21st century offers daring and unprecedented opportunities to 
push cooperation and partnership to levels never before possible. Will we join 
together to adapt our systems for the rough road ahead?  The choice is ours, and 
CTX wants to report our progress along the way. 
I hope you like the first issue we've pulled together.  It represents the first 
step in building on the potent CTFP network of which we are all part.  My hope is that 
we can shape what CTX offers in the future according to your feedback and 
suggestions.  Photo essays, book reviews, and exclusive interviews are among the 
many types of content we hope to feature in CTX.  Take a look at our "Call for 
Submissions" on page 56 to see how you can contribute; comments and other 
feedback about the journal will always be welcome directly at CTXEditor@gmail.com. 
   We are looking forward to providing a compelling platform for this 
burgeoning community of CT professionals. 
Julia McClenon 
Managing Editor 
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Content Recon… a sneak peek 
 First up in this quarter's CTX, "CTFP In Action” features Mr. Shahab Khan of the Bangladeshi 
Enterprise Institute, and the Director of CTFP, Dr. Dennis Walters, giving an up-close account of how 
Bangladesh is developing and implementing a CT strategy from scratch. 
                The misunderstood, if not underestimated, problem of radicalization at the individual level is 
highlighted by CTFP Fellow Jahangir Arasli in his article "Violent Converts: Growing Cluster and Rising 
Trend".  He analyzes dozens of converts' radicalization paths and points to eerily common themes which may 
prove key to heading off this menacing trend.  On the flipside of radicalization, Rohan Gunaratna examines 
the necessity and evolution of terrorist rehabilitation programs, which may be the most "Neglected Secret 
Weapon" in the CT professional's arsenal.   
                Almost precisely three years after the deadly terrorist shooting spree in Mumbai that terrorized 
thousands, four CTFP Fellows analyze the overt and covert financial system which continues to empower 
South Asia's Lashkar-e-Taiba.  Combining their regional insider and outsider perspectives, Geoffrey Kambere, 
Puay Hock Goh, Pranav Kumar, and Fulgence Msafiri candidly offer concrete recommendations for how 
India and her regional partners can eliminate LeT's financial lifelines. 
                As Anwar al-Awlawki takes up his position as the new leader of al-Qaeda, Dr. Bruce Hoffman briefly 
and simply nails down what AQ strategy has been to date, and may well continue to be, regardless of the 
leadership change. 
                Two of our regular columns are also making their debut this issue.  Culture is often narrated and 
defined by its popular arts, and with "The Moving Image," we introduce a departure from the usual analyses 
of current events and ongoing trends.  In the inaugural column, Dr. Kalev I. Sepp draws on his special 
operator background to examine Restrepo, Tim Hetherington's last major film project before his untimely 
death.  Separately, in what will be a regular “Ethics and Insights” column, George Lober will aim to help keep 
our consciences in check.  Most appropriately, he's kicking his column off with the ethics of obeying orders - 
an issue that is achingly relevant for military personnel and civil servants alike.  
                Lastly, the Resources Page will also be a regular feature, and in this issue we've pulled together the 
websites of the CTFP institutions from which most of you have graduated.  Take a quick look: you may not 
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“Where do you start in drafting a 
strategy when no national values 
have been defined?” 
CTFP In Action: Crafting a National Counter-Terror Strategy for Bangladesh  by Dr. Dennis Walters & Mr. Shahab Khan
The United States published its latest National 
Counter Terrorism (CT) Strategy in June of this year.  On 
page five of the strategic document, a direct link 
between American national values and fighting 
terrorism is made.  To Americans this comes as no 
surprise.  Americans expect any national strategy to be 
about protecting the very values that are at the heart of 
their country.  But where do you start in drafting a 
strategy when no national values have been defined?  
The answer of course is with the Constitution.  But what 
if the Constitution has been revised 14 times, and lacks 
a solid judiciary and legal system 
to enforce it?  A complex task 
now becomes even more 
daunting.  This was the situation 
facing Bangladesh when it first 
tackled the problem of drafting a 
national CT strategy more than 
two years ago.   
Prior to 2009, most counterterrorism efforts in 
Bangladesh were focused on short-term security and 
law enforcement measures to the near exclusion of 
longer-term efforts to address underlying conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism.  This began to 
change when Bangladesh reached out to the Defense 
Institution Reform Initiative.   
 The Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), 
a security cooperation program of the U.S. government, 
began working with the Bangladeshi Enterprise Institute 
(BEI) in 2009 to determine which of a number of 
national strategies should be the first to be written and 
published.  By overwhelming consensus, the group 
decided that counterterrorism was the least 
controversial of any of the areas needing a national 
level strategy.  Work began immediately and it quickly 
became apparent that differing views of the problem, 
not to mention very 
complex domestic 
political overtones, 
made the task quite 
daunting.   
 The Combating 
Terrorism Fellowship (CTF) 
joined the effort in 2010, and quietly worked 
behind the scenes with DIRI to help guide the 
development process.  After four sessions spanning 
three years, a draft strategy was delivered to the Home 
Ministry by the joint team of BEI, 
the CTFP, and DIRI.   The Home 
Ministry is now busy finalizing 
the draft, and it is expected to 
be ratified by the Prime Minster 
in the coming days.   
 
              Now comes the hard 
part: implementing the strategy.  A strategy is only as 
good as its implementation, and Bangladesh faces 
several shortfalls in infrastructure that will make 
implementing an aggressive CT strategy a challenge.  
Given the political culture in Bangladesh, consensus and 
sustained commitment will be required for long-term 
implementation. Relevant policymakers and 
stakeholders need training on best practices regarding 
CT initiatives.  Moreover, there is a need to sensitize 
various stakeholders to the necessity of interagency 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism.  This is where 
the global CTF network can be put to good use, assisting 
Bangladesh in achieving a number of key objectives 
outlined in the strategy.  To date, over sixty 
Bangladeshis have attended some form of CTF training, 
ranging from regional terrorist finance seminars to 
graduate degree programs in the United States.  In the 
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in guiding the draft strategy through the ratification 
process.  These same individuals will undoubtedly play 
important roles in implementing the broad objectives of 
the new strategy.   
One of these objectives is to establish a 
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC).  In addition 
to providing intelligence collection and analysis training 
to center operators, the CTF can link the center to a 
global network of professionals.  India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
and Thailand all have a number of CTF alumni currently 
working in various capacities fighting transnational 
terrorism.  Once properly networked with these 
professionals, the NTAC will be ready to conduct 
anticipatory analyses on emerging threats confronting 
Bangladesh.  Conversely, the NTAC will be able to share 
intelligence with their peers in border countries on 
potential problems headed their way.   
Coming in 2012, the CTF hopes to field a 
training tool that will assist countries like Bangladesh in 
training their threat assessment centers.  This platform 
will be a real-time data injection training module 
designed to test regional networks' responses in 
thwarting transnational terrorist attacks.  CTFP ECCO, 
the exclusive online CT network due out later this year, 
and the CTX journal will have the latest information on 
when this tool will be available and how countries can 




Dr. Dennis Walters is the Director of the Combating 
Terrorism Fellowship Program and is a former U.S. 
special operator. 
  
Mr. Shahab Enam Khan is an Assistant Professor of 
International Relations at Jahangirnagar University, 
Bangladesh.  He is widely recognized for his works on 
counterterrorism, security, and public policy making, 
and strengthening democratic institutions in developing 









Look for "CTFP in Action" in further issues of CTX to follow the  
progress of your fellow CTFP alumni. 
 
Gain recognition through CTX  for your international CT project:  
if you're endeavoring to leverage the CTFP network for your country's or organization's 
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The Financing of Lashkar-e-Taiba  by Geoffrey Kambere, Puay Hock Goh, Pranav Kumar,  Fulgence Msafir 
“Very few things worry me as much as the strength and ambition of LeT, a truly malign 
presence in South Asia.”1 
  Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator,  
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, DC 
 
Since its formation in 1990, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has evolved from a local threat 
focused against India to a global jihadist threat.  While many experts have addressed the 
operational facets of LeT, its finances have not received commensurate attention.  This article 
aims to redress that gap.  It is divided into four major parts.  The first part provides a brief 
history about LeT, including its ideology, organization, training, and operations.  The second part 
focuses on LeT finances: its primary funding sources, methods of moving money, and trends in 
spending.  The third part presents a brief case study of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks; and in 
the fourth section, we examine the countermeasures initiated by various actors, weaknesses in 




“In 1984, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi organized a group of 
Ahl-e-Hadith Muslims from Pakistan to wage jihad against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan.”2  A year later, “Hafiz Saeed and Zafar 
Iqbal, two professors at Lahore University, formed the Jamat-
ud-Dawa (JuD) as a missionary group dedicated to the tenets 
of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam.  In 1986, Lakhvi merged his outfit with 
JuD to form the Markaz al-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI).”3  Abdullah 
Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor and the father of modern, 
                                                          
1Daniel Benjamin, “The Obama Administration’s Counterterrorism Policy at One Year,” U.S. Department of State, January 
13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/135171.htm.  
2 Stephen Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 
National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, 2011), 2, retrieved from 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/lashkar_e_taiba. 
3 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 2-3. 
LeT’s commitment to global 
jihad, connections with Al 
Qaeda (AQ), and strong state 
support can be traced back to its 
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global jihad, was one of the cofounders of MDI.  MDI enjoyed active support from both the 
Pakistani Intelligence Services (ISI) and the CIA for fighting alongside the mujahedeen.4  After 
the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan appropriated the assets created during the Afghan war to wage 
a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).  In 1990 LeT was launched as a separate 
military wing of MDI.5  Hence, LeT’s commitment to global jihad, connections with Al Qaeda 
(AQ), and strong state support can be traced back to its very birth as an organization.  
Violence erupted in J&K in 1989; however, the insurgency there started to wane in a few years.  
As a result, Pakistan brought in jihadi elements to resuscitate the Kashmir movement in the mid to late 
1990s.  It is estimated that the ISI spent over $50 million USD annually to support groups such as LeT, 
Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).  See Figure 1 below, which shows the peak of 
violence occurring after the slowdown in the early 1990s.  Consequently, the conflict in J&K became less 
of a local insurgency and more of a campaign sponsored by Pakistan through its many proxies.  The 
growing reputation of LeT as a jihadi force fighting to liberate Kashmir enhanced its ability to recruit and 
raise funds.6 
 
Figure 1. Overall Fatalities in J&K.7 
                                                          
4 C. Christine Fair, Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai Attack (October 13, 2009), retrieved 
from Social Science Research Network website: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1753767; Bruce Riedel, “The Mumbai Massacre 
and its Implications for America and South Asia,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 115. 
5 “Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview” (December 21, 2008), retrieved from Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center website: 
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/gj_e002.htm; and “The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba: 
A Magnet for American Jihadis, ” The Investigative Project on Terrorism, 2010, 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/373.pdf, 5.  
6 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects,5. 
7 “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence,” from South Asia Terrorism Portal website, 
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…cadres are equipped with weapons 
ranging from small arms such as AK-47’s 
to… rocket-propelled grenades, and… 
night-vision devices, global positioning 
systems (GPS), and satellite phones. 
 Ideology 
 Jihad forms the cornerstone of LeT’s ideology.  In a publication titled “Why Are We 
Waging Jihad,” LeT leaders exhort Muslims to liberate themselves from persecution by the 
infidels and identify India, the United States, and Israel as the mortal enemies of Islam.8  LeT’s 
motivation toward the Kashmiri cause is not just territorial but ideological; the group argued 
that once J&K was liberated, it would serve as a base to restore Islamic norms in the Indian 
subcontinent.9  MDI and LeT also aim at transforming Pakistan’s entire society toward their 
radical interpretation of Islam through dawa (proselytizing) and khidmat (social service).10   
LeT recruits from Pakistani followers of the 
Ahl-e-Hadith movement, which is Salafist in 
orientation, and believes that Muslims must return to 
a "pure form" of Islam.  Because the Ahl-e-Hadith 
movement pales in comparison to the strength of 
Deobandi organizations in Pakistan, however, and 
because LeT also alienates many mainstream 
adherents to the Ahl-e-Hadith movement because of 
its calls for jihad, the LeT has generally been almost 
entirely dependent upon the ISI and on Saudi 
benefactors for its funding.11  
Organization 
Hafiz Saeed, one of the founders of JuD, was the aamir (chief) of both MDI and LeT.  The 
MDI is functionally organized into separate departments for dawa, finance, external affairs, 
propaganda, and khidmat, whereas the LeT has a quasi-military structure organized by various 
geographic regions in J&K.  By 2000, MDI and LeT had at least 70 district offices in Pakistan and a 
plethora of smaller ones totaling more than 2,000.12  The organization had its headquarters in 
Muridke, near Lahore Pakistan, in a sprawling compound that houses numerous community 
services.13  Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, LeT is reported to have moved its 
headquarters to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).14  
LeT is reported to have several thousand members, of which 750 cadres are said to be 
operating in Kashmir.15  A sociological profile of 100 LeT cadres found their backgrounds were 
similar to those of low-ranking officers of the Pakistan Army hailing from Punjab and the North 
West Frontier Province (NWFP).  Interestingly, the cadres were better educated compared to 
                                                          
8 Husain Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (Washington, DC: 
Hudson Institute, 2005). 
9 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 3. 
10 Qandeel Siddique, What is Lashkar-e-Taiba (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment,  2008). 
11 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 5, 9. 
12 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 7. 
13 “The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” 8. 
14 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 40. 
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other terrorist groups in the region, as its leaders emphasize the need for education to be able 
to wage a modern jihad.16  
The cadres are equipped with weapons ranging from small arms such as AK-47s to heavier 
weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, and also force multipliers such as night-vision devices, 
global positioning systems (GPS), and satellite phones.  LeT is known for its proficiency in employing 
improvised explosive devices in Kashmir and Afghanistan.17   
LeT’s training is 
divided into three parts: 
Daure-e-Aama (basic 
training), Daure-e-Suffa 
(religious training and 
proselytizing), and Daura-e-
Khasa (specialized training 
for guerilla warfare).  In addition to the three basic stages, selected cadres may receive special training 
for specific skills related to espionage, subversion, sabotage, and maritime operations.18 
Operations 
An overview of the operations conducted by LeT presents a vivid picture of how the terrorist 
organization has evolved from a local to a global threat.  During the 1990s, most of LeT’s operations 
were conducted in J&K, where the organization was known for targeting civilians, and fidayeen attacks 
(LeT’s term for suicide attacks) against security forces.  The December 2000 fidayeen attack against the 
Delhi Red Fort was one of the first terrorist attacks by LeT outside J&K.19  In December 2001, Jaish-e-
Mohammed (JeM) and LeT attacks on the Indian Parliament steered Pakistan and India to the verge of a 
conventional war.  In response to international pressure, Pakistan’s then-President Pervez Musharraf 
banned the MDI and LeT; however, the actions by the state remained cosmetic with no effect on LeT’s 
capabilities or its financial resources in particular.  The July 2006 bomb blasts against the Mumbai local 
rail network that killed more than 200 people was one of LeT’s more recent acts displaying its intent.20  
Over the past decade, LeT has established sleeper cells in India and nurtures radical groups such as 
Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and Students Islamist Movement of India (SIMI).21 
                                                          
16 “The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” 9. 
17 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operation and Future Prospects, 19. 
18 “Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview,” 48. 
19 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects,13. 
20 “Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview,” 31-32. 
21 Fair, Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan, 10. 
 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and LeT attacks on the Indian 
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LeT’s role in global jihad is not 
limited to operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or training would-be 
terrorists. It…is deeply enmeshed 
with global jihadi networks… 
In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001, LeT provided active assistance to AQ in the form of 
safe havens, training, and acting as a gateway for aspiring 
jihadis to reach AQ. 22  Abu Zubayda was one of the most 
notable AQ members captured from a LeT safe house at 
Faisalabad.23  The LeT followed a creative policy to allow its 
cadres leaves of absence during which they could fight with 
AQ as freelancers, which allowed for plausible deniability.  
British forces in Iraq captured at least two LeT operatives in 
2004 and handed them over to the Americans.24  Subsequent to this capture, Musharraf came down 
heavily on LeT, though this incident did not fracture the group’s alliance with the state.  It is noteworthy 
that even at the height of violence within Pakistan, LeT did not turn against the state.25  
LeT’s active involvement in Afghanistan can be traced to mid-2005 in the Kunar and Nuristan 
provinces.26  An attack in July 2008 on a U.S. outpost at Wanat and the Indian embassy in Kabul were 
credited to LeT.27  LeT also acts as a magnet to Western jihadis for training, funding, and even 
operational planning.28  A wide array of American, Canadian, British, French, and Australian Muslims 
(including converts) has been trained in LeT camps.29  The Virginia Paintball Group from the United 
States, Omar Khayyam from Britain, and Willie Brigitte from France were all trained in LeT camps in 
Pakistan and were later involved in providing material and operational support to the organization for its 
global operations.30  
LeT’s role in global jihad is not limited to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or training would-be 
terrorists.  It has been actively involved in various international terrorist attacks and is deeply enmeshed 
with  global jihadi networks: LeT had varying degrees of involvement in the 2005 London train 
bombings, the failed plot by Richard Reid to blow up an airplane using a shoe bomb in 2002, and the 
thwarted attempt to detonate liquid bombs onboard a transatlantic aircraft in 2006.31 
                                                          
22 Stephen Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai (London: The International Center for the Study of Radicalisation 
and Political Violence, 2009). 
23 Stephen Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 
Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, 2010), from http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-
Taiba_in_Perspective.pdf (retrieved May 13, 2011);  Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 12, 16, 
18; “The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” 10. 
24 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai, 16. 
25 Ashley Tellis, “Bad Company: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” testimony to 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2010, transcript retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace website: http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/03/11/bad-company-lashkar-e-tayyiba-and-growing-ambition-of-
islamist-militancy-in-pakistan/jln, 4. 
26 Ryan Clarke, Lashkar-i-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India (2010) from 
the Strategic Studies Institute website: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=973; Tankel, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective, 2.; Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 18. 
27 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai, 20. 
28 “The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” 14. 
29 Fair, Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan, 8, 9.  
30 “The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” 14; “Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview,” 56. 
31 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects, 14; “The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” 14; Clarke, Lashkar-i-








This section covers LeT’s sources of funds, means of transfer of finances, and how the group 
spends the funds.  Sources of funds include state sponsorship, charities, and businesses. Money is 
transferred through banks, use of hawala, and by couriers.  Finally, funds are utilized mainly for dawa 
(preaching), khidmat (provision of social services), and jihad (Islamic campaign against non-believers) 
through recruitment, training, and procurement of equipment and weapons.  
State Sponsorship 
Most observers claim that the LeT is a terrorist group supported by the Pakistani state.  Ashley 
Tellis believes ”it is important to end the farce of treating these entities as if they are truly free agents, 
acting on their own accord, un-tethered to the state organs from which they derive protection, succor, 
and support.”32 
Likewise, Bill Roggio, a managing editor of The Long War Journal, attests that “LeT receives 
support from Pakistan’s military and its intelligence service.”33  In addition, Tankel, writing for the New 
American Foundation, asserts that Pakistani financial and organizational support to LeT increased 
significantly during the 1990s.34  Furthermore, Abubakar Siddique argues that LeT was able to expand 
quickly and launch jihad in the contested area of Himalayan Kashmir in the 1990s because it had been 
encouraged by Pakistan’s army to do so.35  As a final example of state sponsorship, Jyoti Trehan claims 
that the ISI gives both genuine and counterfeit money directly 
to LeT.36  
Despite evidence of Pakistan’s support to militant 
groups including LeT, Pakistan denies the allegations.  After 
9/11, Musharraf was forced to act against indigenous-based 
militants in Kashmir; however, his actions were questionable 
because LeT and JeM continued to operate beyond the “Line 
of Control (LoC)” in the contentious Kashmir area.  As 
reported: 
 Pakistan has refused to crack down on homegrown 
terror groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, despite their covert and overt support 
for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terror groups. Inside Pakistan’s military and intelligence services, 
which are the real powers in Pakistan, groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba are seen as 
“strategic” depth against India, and are used as instruments of foreign policy.37 
                                                          
32 Ashley Tellis, “Bad Company.” 
33 Bill Roggio, “US Designates Lashkar—Taiba’s Charitable Front as Terror Group,” The Long War Journal, November 24, 
2010, http://www. longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/11/us_treasury_designat.php (accessed May 10, 2011).  
34 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” New American Foundation, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_Perspective.pdf (accessed May 13, 2011); 
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businesses, including fish farms, a 
hospital, a market, agriculture 
tracts, mobile clinics, and 
ambulance services. 
 However, Tankel claims that the Pakistan government’s direct support to LeT via ISI started to 
diminish in 2002 following international pressure and the threat of war with India.38  
Charities  
 LeT exploits JuD’s social welfare organization with its more than 50,000 registered members to 
spread its influence and to raise funds.39  Within Pakistan, donation boxes are placed in many JuD 
offices and shops spread out all over the country, and at public gatherings, where money is solicited for 
the continuation of LeT’s ideology and to celebrate the martyrdom of fighters.40   
For example, within Europe, Britain is a major center for fundraising for LeT because of its very 
large Pakistani immigrant population.41  But some of the money raised for JuD charitable activities is 
used to finance LeT’s operations; in fact, funding for the plot to use liquid bombs to detonate 
transatlantic aircraft in 2006 was funneled through the charities that raised funds in British mosques for 
earthquake victims in 2005.42  Additionally, JuD officials often travel to Saudi Arabia seeking donations 
for new schools at highly inflated costs that in turn are 
directed to fund LeT militant operations.43  
LeT also receives charitable aid directly, 
especially from donors in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states.  According to Jonathan Fighel, Saudi Arabia 
covertly supports and promotes the “Saudi-Wahabbi 
political and religious influence in the Sunni Muslim 
world”44 through its worldwide network of charities.  
LeT is one beneficiary.45  In Kuwait, the Revival of 
Islamic Society has also provided direct support to al-
Qaeda and LeT.46 
Businesses 
  LeT controls many legitimate businesses, including fish farms, a hospital, a market, agricultural 
tracts, mobile clinics, and ambulance services.47  The “farmers and labor wing” at JuD is responsible for 
the collection of ushr, an Islamic land tax, which is compulsory for farmers who must contribute 10 
percent of their total produce to charity for the provision of essential services, especially in areas where 
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the government of Pakistan has failed to provide those social services.48  Notably, the group collects 
hides of most of the animals slaughtered during the holy festivals of Eid al-Adha and sells them for a 
profit.49   This practice has emerged as a big boost to the group’s income as it is estimated that during 
each Eid festival at least 1.2 million animal hides are collected.50 
Illegal Activities 
 LeT’s illegal fundraising activities include false trade invoicing, counterfeiting, extortion, and 
involvement in the drug trade.   With false trade invoicing, the LeT overcharges for its goods or services.  
For example, the group sometimes adds an extra “5 to 10 Pakistani rupees for the jihad to the bill 
especially when selling various Jihadi publications.”51   Conversely, under-invoicing occurs when 
Kashmiri carpet dealers reduce the value of their exports to Gulf countries, and the difference in the 
true value of the merchandise and the value shown on the invoice returns to India through the hawala 
channel.52 
 Counterfeiters have enabled LeT to raise money by integrating the genuine money being 
brought across the border into Kashmir with counterfeit money.53  Extortion of money from the local 
population is also common with corrupt 
officials in the Jammu and Kashmir 
region.54  There are limited reports of LeT 
direct involvement in drug trafficking.  
However, given LeT’s  geographic 
location, the group is almost certainly 
tempted to be involved in narcotics smuggling because of the huge  profit potential, and because there 
are fewer restrictions than with money received through state sponsorship and donations.55  Some 
sources say increasing trade in narcotics, in addition to state sponsorship, has enabled LeT to maintain 
its terrorism activities.56  In 2002, there was a huge harvest of opium on the border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan that was estimated to be 5,000 tons by international agencies.57  This yield was 
refined into injectable heroin in laboratories and smuggled by ISI narcotic smugglers; the harvest’s 
estimated worth of $2.5 billion USD is reportedly being used by Pakistan to support the Taliban and 
terrorism in J&K.58  
 Moving Money 
 LeT moves money through traditional banks, hawala, and cash couriers.   Moving money 
through banks via the account number displayed on the group’s website has proved to be the safest 
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If well-built cross-border relations 
between the hawaladers do exist, then 
curbing financing for terrorism inside 
India will be more difficult… in fact 
most hawaladers in transitional 
networks in South Asia are related. 
method for LeT.  Money from over 400,000 Pakistanis living in Britain  moves legally from British banks 
to Pakistani banks, particularly as funds raised for families in Pakistan or victims of catastrophic events, 
such as the devastating earthquake in 2005.59  However, much of that legally transferred money may get 
funneled to terrorist organizations.  Jayshree Bajoria notes that about $10 million USD was transferred 
to Pakistan in 2005, and more than half of that was channeled to LeT activities.60  Also, Trehan, an 
inspector in the Indian police service, further notes that “Jammu and Kashmir banks have played a fairly 
dubious role in channeling terrorist funding in Jammu and Kashmir.”61  Harvard’s Jessica Stern asserts 
that “LeT… has acquired so much capital that they are actually planning to open their own bank.”62 
 Hawala is an informal way of transferring value and is also a substitute remittance scheme, 
which operates differently from the established and regulated procedures of banks and other financial 
institutions.63  Investigations by India’s intelligence agencies after the Mumbai attacks in November 
2008 revealed that LeT used hawala operatives and businessmen to move money from Gulf countries to 
LeT cells.64  The hawala network has proved to be effective and cheap.  Hawala channels were not only 
used to finance the Mumbai 2008 attacks but also for the Bangalore bombings in July 2008 and other 
terrorist attacks which have exposed hawala operators from Bangladesh and Oman.65  These incidents 
imply that hawala is commonly used by LeT, which presents a challenge for Indian counterterrorism 
measures.  If well-built cross-border relations between the 
hawaladers do exist, then curbing financing for terrorism 
inside India will be more difficult.66  Hawala is built on 
trust and strong relationships among dealers so that even 
if one is arrested, investigators rarely get the desired 
domino effect; in fact, most hawaladers in transnational 
networks in South Asia are related.67 
 Trehan reports that the Pakistani ISI sometimes 
directly hands cash to terrorists, whereby the terrorists 
themselves can carry huge sums of money across the 
border into the Kashmir region.68  This mechanism is good 
for the terrorists and the ISI as there are no electronic 
records in case of future investigations.  In addition, 
                                                          
59 Jayshree Bajoria, “Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (aka Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba),” from 
Council on Foreign Relations website: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-
lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar--taiba/p17882#p2, (January 14, 2010); “Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview,” 19. 
60 Bajoria, “Lashkar-e-Taiba.” 
61 Trehan, “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism,” 208. 
62 Clarke, Lashkar-i-Taiba, 407. 
63 Animesh Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network Targets India from the Gulf States,” Terrorism Monitor, 7, no 19 (July 
2, 2009): 8, from The Jamestown Foundation website: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35221&tx_ttnews[backPid]=412&no_cache=1. 
64 Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network,” 6. 
65 Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network,” 6. 
66 Clarke, Lashkar-i-Taiba, 406. 
67 Clarke, Lashkar-i-Taiba, 406. 




Vol. 1, No.1      CTX 
 
15 
preachers from JuD move freely while promoting jihad, returning to their bases with money they have 
collected, becoming, in essence, cash couriers.69  At higher levels, money is moved to Kashmir by air 
transport from Pakistan through Nepal and Bangladesh to India because there are no constraints on 
moving money from Nepal to India, and this kind of money finds  its way into the hands of the terrorist 
organization.70   Additionally, Animesh Roul claims that “LeT has managed to build alternate routes 
through the porous borders of Nepal and Bangladesh while establishing bases in the Gulf countries.”71   
How LeT Spends 
  LeT spends funds in three major ways: khidmat, dawa, and military operations.  In the effort to 
gain popular support, LeT’s social warfare department called Idarah Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK) plays a vital 
role by providing social services to the local populace.72  On October 8, 2005, LeT is reported to have 
been the first to come to the aid of three million earthquake victims in Kashmir and Pakistan’s 
Northwest Frontier Province when the Pakistani government 
was slow in taking immediate action.73  
 The group has utilized a good amount of money in its 
efforts to influence society through preaching and social welfare 
programs (dawa).74  This has been done through recruiting and 
the spreading of ideology in J&K, often using funds donated for 
its social services work.  Almost half of the external aid sent by 
Pakistani expatriates in the United Kingdom for the earthquake 
victims was funneled to the growth of the LeT.75  Furthermore, 
“during the last decade, LeT purchased real estate throughout 
the country to open new offices and had more than 1,500 
offices operating full time across Pakistan by the middle of the 
decade.”76  LeT is said to be investing some of the money it has 
raised in its legitimate businesses and enterprises in Islamic 
institutions and dawa model schools in Lahore and Muridke.  
These schools, in turn, have been sources of revenue to the 
terrorist organization through tuition payments.77   
 A hefty amount of LeT’s money goes to its military 
operations.  These operations are mostly efforts aimed at India 
and the widening of the U. S. footprint in India.78 U.S. 
intelligence reveals that “in 2009, LeT’s annual military 
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$33 million USD is being spent 
on incentives for operatives and for 
their leaders, who reportedly get a 
much higher rate of remuneration.  
 
operations budget ... totaled more than $5 million [USD] per year.”79 
 As part of its operational requirements, LeT recruits “get a certain down payment on 
recruitment, a certain amount as monthly remuneration and a certain amount of incentives for big acts 
of terrorism and a certain amount as end of the tenure payment, which is roughly two years.”80  
Furthermore, considering various estimations “on 
average Rs 3 lakhs is being spent on funding a Kashmiri 
terrorist and up to Rs 5 lakhs is being spent on funding a 
foreign terrorist.”81  It is estimated that the staggering 
amount of $33 million USD is being spent on incentives 
for operatives and for their leaders, who reportedly get a 
much higher rate of remuneration.  In addition, the 
terrorist group occasionally pays the families of 
operatives who are killed and those who take part in 
martyrdom actions, which also helps win local support.82  
 LeT also supports other terrorist groups and individuals.  It is reported that LeT financially 
supported JeM in its attack on India’s parliament in December 2001.83  Other groups that have received 
LeT support include Indian and Western jihadist organizations.  A French prosecutor asserted that LeT’s 
representative in Paris served as a “compass” and provided logistical and financial support for Richard 
Reid, who attempted to detonate explosives hidden in his shoes while on board a flight bound for the 
United States from France in December 2001.   And notable terrorist attacks against India, including the 
Mumbai 2008 attack, have been financed and supported by LeT cells in the Gulf.84   
2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks 
 
The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks should put to rest any doubts about LeT’s threat to the 
international community.85  The presumed reasons for the attacks were to derail the peace process 
between India and Pakistan and act as a provocation to push the two neighbors toward war.  It was 
expected that punitive action by the Indian Army would impel Pakistan to move its forces from the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region to the border with India.  This would have relieved the pressure on the 
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  Surveillance in preparation for the attacks was carried out beginning in 2006, and the 
perpetrators of the attack were trained over 18 months at four different locations in Pakistan.87  The 10 
terrorists departed Karachi on a small boat, transferred to a larger vessel, and eventually hijacked an 
Indian merchant vessel to sail them to India.  Each terrorist had one AK-47, 200 bullets, eight grenades, a 
cellular phone, and other supplies.  The group left a satellite phone behind in the boat, thus providing 
crucial evidence against LeT and the ISI.88  On arrival at Mumbai, the terrorists divided into groups of 
two men and attacked five main targets: two five-star hotels, a railway terminal, a café  frequented by 
Westerners, and a Jewish community center.  In all, 166 people were killed; the death toll included 30 
non-Indians, including six Americans 
and six Jews.89  
The operation was controlled 
in real time from Pakistan over 
cellular phones.90  The phone 
numbers used by the terrorists were linked to an account registered with Callaphonex, a U.S. VOIP 
provider.  Payments for the phone account were made in two installments of approximately $200 to 
$250 USD each, through Money Gram in Pakistan and Western Union in Italy.  The e-mail account used 
to set up the service was traced to 10 different IP addresses in Pakistan, Chicago, Kuwait, and Moscow.91 
Nine terrorists were killed, and one, Ajmal Kasab, was captured alive.  Confessions extracted 
from this lone captive confirmed that all 10 terrorists were Pakistani LeT cadres.  The evidence also 
pointed toward intimate ISI involvement in the attacks.92  Under severe international pressure, Pakistan 
arrested Lakhvi for his role as the mastermind of the attacks; one of his visitors at the jail was the ISI 
chief.  Hafiz Saeed was put under house arrest but released soon thereafter; JuD was banned but 
continues to operate under new identities.93  The LeT considered the operation a grand success and is 
reported to have planned several attacks against Indian and American targets to mark the first 
anniversary of the operation in 2009.94 
 Costs of the Mumbai Attack 
  Trehan, a high ranking Indian police officer, has estimated the yearly cost of a Pakistani terrorist 
fighting in Kashmir to be approximately $12,500 USD; that figure includes training, monthly payments, 
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awards for a spectacular act, and money to family members.95  Similarly, we estimate the following 
costs in U.S. dollars for various material and activities for the Mumbai attacks as shown below: 
 Personnel Costs ($12,500 per person)  - $125,000. 
 Surveillance (money paid to David Headley) - $30,000. 
 Weapons and equipment ($1,500 each)  - $15,000. 
 VOIP accounts     - $500. 
 Total     
 - $170,500 
If we add in funds for incidental expenditures, one can 
estimate that the Mumbai terrorist attack may have cost the 
LeT around $200,000 USD.  When compared with LeT’s 
overall annual budget (probably in the $50 million or more 
range),96 it is evident that terrorism remains a low-cost 
endeavor.  
Counter Measures and Recommendations 
 
We turn now to the actions that have been and should be taken to more effectively constrain 
this violent wing of LeT.  We will first look at the actions that have been taken by international bodies 
and India, as well as the limitations of those actions.  Thereafter, we will offer some recommendations 
about how the systems could be improved to better combat the financing instruments of LeT.  
At this juncture, it is important to highlight that even though LeT has gone global with its aims, it 
never ceases to use India as a target for two key reasons.  One, LeT continues to serve as a proxy for 
Pakistan, which allows it to be sheltered by Pakistan; and two, its distorted form of Ahl-e-Hadith 
ideology declares India a mortal enemy.  Therefore, it is necessary that we consider India’s actions and 
its system to combat the financing of terrorists (CFT)  in this segment as they form a critical part of the 
whole repertoire of measures that need to be taken against LeT.  
International Response against LeT 
   The main actions taken by international actors to counter or constrain the financing 
instruments of LeT were to freeze and seize the assets of LeT leaders.  Suffice it to note that these 
actions were targeted mainly at the movement of money.97  These measures against LeT and its front 
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organizations such as JuD were carried out either directly by the United Nations and the United States or 
indirectly through pressure applied to Pakistan.  Below are some examples of the measures taken: 
 In 2002, Pakistan banned LeT, and the United States labeled it a foreign terrorist 
organization.98   
 At the request of India, the United States labeled Dawood Ibrahim  an international 
terrorist in October 2003.99  The U.S. government seized his assets found in the U.S. and 
pressured Pakistan to arrest him.   
 In 2008, the United Nations declared JuD a front organization for LeT.  Because of this, 
the government of Pakistan was pressured into taking action.  Assets of nine LeT leaders 
were seized. The main instruments applied were U.N. Resolution 1390 and 1373.100  
 Most recently, as noted earlier, the United States in 2010 exacted an executive order 
against The Falah-i Insaniat Foundation (FIF), essentially the renamed JuD, and named it  
a terrorist organization. 
India’s Responses against LeT  
 Similar to international agencies such as the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), India has come to regard terrorist financing as a key enabler of terrorist operations in and 
against India.  It has likewise taken steps to address these terrorist-financing concerns.  Below are some 
of the actions that India has taken to combat LeT’s financing sources: 
 LeT was banned in India in 2001.101 
 As noted in the earlier section, through a bilateral arrangement with the United States, 
India was able to declare Dawood Ibrahim an international terrorist. 
 India banned hawala as the government knows most terrorist financing in India is done 
informally rather than through the formal financial system.102   
 One of the more recent measures taken was to join the FATF as a full member in 
2009.103  By doing so, India demonstrated its commitment to strengthening its 
legislative and regulatory system toward money laundering and terrorist financing. It is 
making those moves with the hope of constricting funding sources not only to LeT, but 
also to several other terrorist groups operating in India.   
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 …the ISI, the Pakistan Army, and 
LeT all recruit their members from 
the Punjab and northwest regions 
of Pakistan, resulting in the 
members of all the groups having 
familial ties with one another. 
 
Limitations 
  Even though both international agencies and India have taken substantial steps against LeT, 
these measures have not been effective.  This is demonstrated by the fact that LeT is still getting its 
funding not only from the government of Pakistan but also other overseas sources to support its 
operations.  The key limitation in the international anti-money laundering (AML)/CFT system lies in the 
fact that its measures and recommendations are, by and large, nonbinding in nature, including both U.N. 
and FATF resolutions.  For example, in applying U.N. Resolution 1373, India can do nothing against 
members of LeT residing in Pakistan.  As India has no jurisdiction over LeT, it can only hope to prosecute 
LeT with Pakistan’s cooperation.104   
 Unfortunately, Pakistan is not fully cooperative when it comes to fighting LeT, and its actions are 
often little more than cosmetic in nature.  As already 
mentioned, the reasons for this response are three-fold.  
First, the LeT serves a strategic purpose for the 
government of Pakistan.   LeT’s goals are aligned with 
those of the Pakistani government; it has been reported 
that the Pakistani government considers LeT the most 
reliable terrorism asset it can wield against India.105  
Second, there are many ties between LeT and the ISI and 
Pakistan Army, which makes it hard for the latter to act 
against LeT.  This is because the ISI, the Pakistan Army, and 
LeT all recruit their members from the Punjab and 
northwest regions of Pakistan, resulting in the members of 
all the groups having familial ties with one another.106  
Third, there could be severe blowback on the government of Pakistan from two main sources if it acts 
against LeT.  The first potential source of trouble is the population that receives social services from 
LeT/JuD.  As LeT/JuD continues to provide crucial social services to the Pakistani populace, any actions 
the government takes against the former will mean disruption of these services.  The second potential 
source of blowback is from LeT itself.  LeT has thus far not turned against the Pakistani government 
because of the impunity it enjoys in Pakistan.  If the situation were to change, it is not hard to see that 
LeT might well join the rest of its counterparts (other terrorist groups in Pakistan) in fighting against the 
Pakistani government. 
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 Within India, India’s CFT system is fragmented and uncoordinated and has not evolved to the 
point where it can be used as an effective tool.  According to Saini: 
Terrorist financing-related information at present is not a priority for the central or state 
intelligence agencies. … As a result, intelligence reporting on the issue lacks overall 
coordinated direction and is incident driven.  Moreover, responsibility for the problem is 
diffused amongst a plethora of agencies, each working in watertight compartments, 
resulting in lack of accountability.107 
 
In addition to using the anti-money laundering mechanisms, the entire CFT system is merely an 
enhancement to India’s old methods for combating insurgencies in the past.  As a result, terrorist groups 
such as LeT and its affiliates in India continue to be able to finance their operations in India not only 
through the formal but also the informal financial system.108  These deficiencies in India’s CFT system 
are reported in a FATF evaluation undertaken in 2010.109 
Recommendations  
 The following are some recommendations that will, hopefully, help to mitigate these limitations.  
In the international arena, regional and global organizations need to continue to pressure Pakistan by 
making Pakistan more accountable 
for the actions of LeT, as well as its 
support organization and 
structures.  Resolving the issue of 
Kashmir, clearly a difficult task, 
would also undermine support for 
LeT.  This would reduce funding from Pakistan’s expatriates supporting the J&K cause, and give the  
Pakistani government more freedom of action against LeT, which should lead to more effective 
countermeasures.   
 Internationally, organizations and states need to strengthen the AML/CFT system by adopting a 
more comprehensive monitoring and tracking system for charities; by making some measures more 
binding with the help of concrete evidence; by addressing the sources of funding from the Gulf region to 
LeT; and by putting more pressure on those states from which these sources are flowing, such as Dubai. 
  India, for its part, should strengthen diplomatic measures since most of India’s terrorism 
problems are funded by external sources.  It should continue to seek assistance from agencies like the 
FATF and the UN to act against supporters of LeT and affiliated groups operating in India.  Also, bilateral 
arrangements with the U.S. will help in pressuring Pakistan.  India should also aim to work more 
cooperatively with Pakistan to resolve the LeT issue.  
 Internally, India should set up a “whole of government” approach toward CFT, which crosses 
many domains, and should create an inter-government agency to coordinate and synergize efforts.  
                                                          
107 Saini, “Problems and Prospects,” 93. 
108 Saini, “Problems and Prospects,” 93-94. 
109 For more information on the weaknesses of India’s CFT system, see Financial Action Task Force, Anti-Money Laundering. 
For the purpose of illustration, some examples of these weaknesses are (1) India’s ineffective judiciary system toward 
AML/CFT, (2) poor control of money movement across borders taking into consideration the large volume of human traffic 
flow as well as India’s cash-based economy, and (3) a weak Suspicion Transaction Reporting (STR) mechanism. 
India should set up a “whole of government” 
approach…which crosses many domains,…build up dedicated 
resources to counter terrorism funding not only at the central 
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India should also: bring the CFT system more in line with FATF standards; regulate NGOs and charities in 
India, including hawala (and perhaps consider lifting the ban on hawala so that it is not driven 
underground); give the intelligence and law enforcement agencies a more active role in CFT; build up 
dedicated resources to counter terrorism funding not only at the central government and state levels, 
but also at grassroots levels (e.g. police forces); enforce stronger border control, particularly with Nepal 
and Bangladesh; increase public awareness about the ills and concomitant effects of terrorist financing 
to create an environment conducive to building public trust in government policies; and leverage its 
population’s skills in Internet technology, especially as terrorist financing is moving into the cyber 
domain.110  
Conclusion  
 Today, LeT has global aims.  LeT’s funding sources have also diversified significantly and are no 
longer dependent solely on the government of Pakistan.  The fact that LeT is still functioning and 
continuing to receive substantial financial support from various overseas sources means that the 
international CFT measures in place are not sufficiently effective.  India’s ineffectual system in 
constraining LeT’s support to its affiliate groups in India further illuminates the gaps in the CFT measures 
against LeT.  Cumulatively, all of this means more needs to be done.  To this end, this article has 
attempted to provide some recommendations for how international and Indian CFT systems could be 
enhanced to constrict this lifeblood for LeT.  More importantly, regardless of what strategy the 
international bodies and India are to employ, Pakistan must be included as part of the formula because 
Pakistan is still a strategic shelter for LeT.  Without Pakistan’s cooperation and active participation, LeT 
may never be eliminated. 
 
Geoffrey Kambere, from Uganda, Puay Hock Goh, from Singapore, Pranav Kumar, from India and 
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“Al Qaeda continues to seek out citizens 
of enemy countries, especially converts 
to Islam, who possess “clean” passports 
and thus can be more easily deployed for 
attacks in Western countries…” 
 Al Qaeda’s Strategy by Bruce Hoffman 
Al Qaeda’s senior leadership is indisputably being 
pressed to an extent not seen since the opening phases of 
the war on terrorism ten years ago.  Members of the CTFP 
community should recognize that the systematic killing of 
well over thirteen key senior al Qaeda commanders in 
unmanned drone attacks since July 2008 has appreciably 
thinned al Qaeda’s once deep bench of battle-hardened 
operatives, to say nothing of their loss of Osama bin Laden 
himself.  Reports that U.S. Treasury Department initiatives 
have seriously impacted al Qaeda’s finances are also often 
cited as proof of the movement’s faltering capabilities.  At 
the same time, however, throughout the past few years, al 
Qaeda has made fresh inroads in countries as diverse as 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.  Al 
Qaeda’s success in this respect is the product of an 
identifiable strategy.  More disquieting, its progress in 
these diverse arenas has again raised the threat of a 
significant terrorist attack 
occurring in the United States, 
Europe or elsewhere.  The 
foiled attempt to blow-up 
Northwest Airlines flight # 253 
over Detroit on Christmas Day 
2009 was a sober reminder 
both of the al Qaeda 
movement’s continued vitality 
and the threat it still poses. 
  
Four Functioning, Longstanding 
Operational Levels 
 Al Qaeda’s continued survival has been facilitated 
in large measure by a loose organizational structure that 
uniquely embodies both top down and bottom up 
approaches.  Unlike most other terrorist groups, which 
tend to be organized hierarchically——in a rigid pyramidal 
fashion with a commander at the top, issuing orders to the 
individual cells arrayed below——from its beginning, al 
Qaeda was conceived to function as a flatter and more 
linear-type network.  This bi-furcated structure has served 
the movement well and likely accounts for its continued 
longevity despite the significant measures directed against 
it.  The al Qaeda movement thus comprises four distinct, 
but not mutually exclusive, dimensions.  They are:  
1. Al Qaeda Central Senior Leadership.  This 
category comprises the movement’s core leadership.  It is 
believed that this hardcore remains centered in or around 
the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders and continues to 
exert actual coordination, if not some direct command 
and control in terms of commissioning attacks, directing 
surveillance and collating reconnaissance, planning 
operations, and approving their execution.   
2. Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates.  This 
category embraces formally established insurgent or 
terrorist groups that over the years have benefited from al 
Qaeda’s largesse and spiritual guidance and continue to 
receive training, arms, intelligence, and other assistance.  
Among these groups who are 
ones who have adopted the 
al Qaeda moniker (e.g., al 
Qaeda in the Lands of the 
Islamic Maghreb [aQIM], al 
Qaeda in Iraq, and al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula); as 
well as key allies like Lashkar-
e-Taiba (LeT), responsible for 
the 2008 Mumbai attacks; or 
the al Shabaab (“the youth”) 
group in Somalia, among others.  Both the number and 
geographical diversity of these entities is proof of al 
Qaeda’s continued influence and vitality. 
3. Al Qaeda Network.  These are sleepers or 
local, dispersed cells of al Qaeda adherents who have or 
have had some direct connection with al Qaeda, 
including training.  
4.  Al Qaeda Galaxy.  These are home-grown 
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and South and Southeast Asia——as well as local converts 
to Islam mostly living in Europe, Africa and North America 
as well, who have no direct connection with al Qaeda (or 
any other identifiable terrorist group), but nonetheless are 
prepared to carry out attacks in solidarity with or support 
of al Qaeda’s radical jihadi agenda. 
Al Qaeda’s Six Core, Subordinate 
Strategies 
  In service to its global strategy, al Qaeda today 
pursues six separate lines of operation or subordinate 
strategies: 
1.  Attrition.  Al Qaeda seeks to overwhelm, 
distract, and exhaust its adversaries.  Given both the U.S. 
and the world’s profound economic travails and attendant 
financial upheaval, al Qaeda likely perceives the imminent 
success of this strategy of attrition as more tangible than 
at any previous time.  
2.  Division.  In tandem with the above, al Qaeda 
also actively seeks to create, foster, and encourage 
fissures and divisions within the global alliance arrayed 
against it.  This entails the selective targeting of coalition 
partners in the U.S.-led war on terrorism both in 
operational theatres like Afghanistan and at home——
through attacks on mass transit and other “soft” targets in 
the national capitals and major cities of European 
countries allied with the U.S.  
3.  Failing states.  Meanwhile, al Qaeda 
continues to conduct local campaigns of subversion and 
destabilization in critical operational theaters where failed 
or failing states provide new opportunities for al Qaeda to 
extend its reach and consolidate its presence.  Countries 
and regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, 
the Sahel, East Africa, and Somalia fall within this 
category. 
4.  Force Multiplier.  Al Qaeda also actively 
provides guidance, assistance, and other help to local 
affiliates and associated terrorist movements.  Al Qaeda 
thus works behind the scenes in these theaters “plussing-
up” the capabilities of indigenous terrorist groups both in 
terms of kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic 
operations——including information operations, 
propaganda, and psychological warfare. 
5.  Converts and “Clean Skins.”  Al Qaeda 
continues to seek out citizens of enemy countries, 
especially converts to Islam, who possess “clean” 
passports and thus can be more easily deployed for 
attacks in Western countries without necessarily 
arousing suspicion.   
6.  Opportunism.  Al Qaeda continues to be as 
opportunistic as it is instrumental: seeking to identify 
defensive gaps that can be quickly and effectively 
exploited for attacks. 
 In sum, al Qaeda stubbornly continues to pursue 
strategies that, however unrealistic or fruitless, extend its 
longevity, and sustain its potential to cause death, 
destruction, and global disruption. 
 
 
Bruce Hoffman is the Director of the Center for Peace and 
Security Studies at Georgetown University's Walsh School 
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An American officer once told me he 
didn’t need a class in ethics because his 
ethical code was the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice—period. Seriously? 
  Ethics  & Insights by George Lober 
The form of ethics I am 
interested in and teach at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California focuses on individual 
ethical decision-making. Essentially, I 
am interested in trying to figure out 
the right thing for an individual to do, 
squaring that decision with the other 
choices, ramifications, and possible 
consequences, and then trying 
to come to some peace with 
that decision. 
When it comes to 
military related issues of 
ethics, such an interest, 
unfortunately, puts me at odds 
with certain ethical theorists 
and military leaders who 
believe the answers to such issues of 
our time have been pre-determined, 
and one need only review the specific 
article and line from an appropriate 
manual to remove any doubt. (For 
example, an American officer once 
told me he didn’t need a class in 
ethics because his ethical code was 
the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice—period.) Seriously?  
Unfortunately, I don’t see it 
that way. Taking that position, it 
seems to me, allows an individual to 
abdicate ethical responsibility for his 
or her actions—the old justification, 
“I was following orders” . . . or 
“regulations” . . . or “policy” . . .  It 
also risks reducing every military 
course in ethics to an exercise in 
reiteration: 
INSTRUCTOR: “What is the rule in this 
situation, class?”  
STUDENTS: “The rule is Article 17, sub 
section 6, Sir.”  
INSTRUCTOR: “Very Good. Let’s move 
on. What is the rule . . . ”  
 
 And it presumes because a 
military law or regulation exists, the 
ethical thing to do is always to 
follow it. But is that really the case?  
One of the difficult questions 
I first explore with my students is 
whether a civilian law can be 
unethical? Invariably, the majority of 
my students conclude, yes, it can.  
History offers lots of examples: the 
segregation laws in America, the laws 
of apartheid in South Africa, etc.  
The question then becomes, 
can a military order (or regulation) 
that is legal also be unethical?  This is 
trickier, but again, most of my 
students concur that on rare 
occasions, an order can be both legal 
and unethical.  An example often 
cited is the firebombing of Dresden.  
The order to carry out that action 
may have been legal, but the 
deliberate and indiscriminate 
targeting of civilians—if one buys that 
targeting civilians is unethical—was 
certainly morally questionable.  
Another is the firebombing of Tokyo.  
Was the order to bomb Tokyo legal?  
Probably. Was the consequent 
indiscriminate killing of 100,000 
Japanese immoral?  Suddenly 
answering that gets a little dicey, 
particularly when strong opinions 
emerge.   
Finally, there is the big 
question: if an order is legal, but 
following it can be unethical, 
what’s one to do?  Follow it 
anyway?  Mitigate the action 
somehow? Refuse the order and 
fall on one’s sword? 
Working through that 
question and a host of other 
military and civilian issues with you 
will be the focus of this column. 
 
 
George Lober guides U.S. and 
international military students 
through the tricky terrain of ethics 
and critical thinking at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
CA.  Your honest critiques and 
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Violent Converts to Islam: Growing Cluster and Rising Trend                        by Jahangir E. Arasli 
The role of Muslim converts in the context of Islamist homegrown terrorism remains largely 
below the radar screen for both researchers and policymakers. Despite evidence suggesting that 
increasing numbers of converts are playing significant roles within terrorist organizations, most 
conventional wisdom still treats them as a marginal phenomenon rather than a sustained trend.111  
A person who converts to Islam does not, by default, pose a security problem, and the ability of 
an individual to convert to Islam should be assured as an essential component of the freedom of belief 
and expression. Neither Islam nor conversion to it is a threat as such, and only a small minority of Islamic 
converts actually turns to violence.112 However, although the percentage of violent converts is small, 
evidence suggests they constitute a growing pool of hundreds, if not thousands, of very dangerous 
people who represent direct security threats.  
This article provides an overview of the issue by reviewing individual cases of converts who have 
been involved in violence, considers why and how individuals might be converted to a violent strain of 
Islam, and looks at how these converts are being used by terrorist organizations and in terrorist 
operations. Of course, this one essay cannot cover all aspects related to the issues of violent converts; 
rather it aims only to chart the general contours of the problem and provide some initial thoughts on 
the subject, leaving particular aspects, as well as policy recommendations, for future research. All views 
expressed in the article are my own, and they do not reflect the official position of any institution. 
Definitions 
Presented here are some key terms and explanations for how those terms are used throughout 
the article.  
Conversion: In simplest terms, religious conversion might be understood as a change from one 
faith to another. Conversion can also take place when an individual with no religious faith or a religious 
identity affiliated chiefly with national or ethnic roots becomes a practicing believer of a different 
faith.113 
                                                          
111 For example, the issue of violent converts was rarely mentioned in Europol’s “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports” (TE-SAT) 
that were issued before 2010. (These reports are available at the agency’s website: 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/2). However, the TE-SAT 2010 did address the issue, noting that converts were 
being used by terrorist organizations, as will be detailed later in this article.  
112 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Jihadism in Europe and the Middle East,” in Thomas Olsen and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Islamism as Social 
Movement (Aarhus, Denmark: Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalization, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, 
2009), 41; accessed February 1, 2010; http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-
filer/H%C3%A6fte2final.pdf. 
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Violent Islamic converts: Although there is no universally accepted definition of this term, I use it 
in this article to signify a convert who adopts a new identity based on or linked to a vision of Islam that 
justifies or encourages violence, including terrorism.  
Conversion-radicalization-activation (CRA) loop: The CRA loop includes conversion to extreme 
interpretations of Islam, which is the first and most important step to allow for further radicalization, 
and can eventually lead to the activation of violent intentions (i.e. actually carrying out terrorist attacks). 
Though their individual paths may vary, almost all violent converts perform a CRA loop.114  
Violent activity: This term is used primarily to refer to terrorism and terrorist-related activities. 
In addition to direct actions, it also includes related political and ideological activities, such as recruiting 
and spreading extremist ideas, as well as fomenting violence through organizational, technical, materiel, 
or financial means. The term may also be applied to certain “gray area” cases that at first glance appear 
purely criminal, yet on closer inspection might be linked in some way to Islamic conversion.115 
Overview of Links Between Violence and Islamic Converts 
Before 9/11 
Prior to the 9/11 watershed event, Islamic converts who turned to violence were rare but not 
unheard of. The first generation of violent converts can be traced back to the late 1960s and early 1970s 
when a number of young African Americans joined either the radical wing of the Nation of Islam 
movement, the Black Panthers, or similar violent anti-establishment groups. Later, in the 1970s and 
1980s, a number of American converts—white and black—were admitted to the extremist Islamist sect 
Jamaat ul-Fuqra (JuF), a Pakistan-linked group that was active throughout the United States and often 
involved in violent operations. In 1980, American convert David Belfield killed a prominent Iranian 
opposition leader who lived in exile in the United States. Belfield, also known as Dawood Salahuddin, 
had been recruited by the security services of the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. 
However, this first generation was not embedded into the broader context of global jihad that 
was emerging. Rather, they mostly represented “protest conversions,” like the Black Panthers who 
chose Islam as a tool to assert their racial identity while 
mixing the religion with a good portion of Marxism. Others 
were contained within a peripheral trend such as the case of 
converts who chose to join JuF. Or, in some cases, such as 
Belfield’s, they acted as operatives of a foreign intelligence 
service. It is important to note that most converts in those 
years lacked an elaborate religious justification for violence.  
The second generation of violent converts arrived 
with the wave of global transformation that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s and with the 
ascendance of radical, political Islamism and associated violence. The war in Bosnia was one of the first 
                                                          
114 I am introducing this notion of CRA loop or a “conversion ladder” for the first time in this essay.  
115 An example of such a “gray area” case is John Allen Muhammad, the “Beltway Sniper,” who killed at least 10 people in the 
Washington, D.C, area in 2002. He was a Gulf War vet who had converted to Islam (“Muhammad a Gulf War Vet, Islam Convert,” 
CNN.com, January 26, 2004, accessed April 19, 2010,  http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/10/24/muhammad.profile). 
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This worldwide preaching campaign… 
aimed primarily at Muslims from 
migrant communities, also delivered 
a byproduct—Western converts to 
Islam… 
conflicts to  experience this growing phenomenon. The conflict attracted dozens of European converts 
who were radicalized while fighting on the Muslim side. The notorious “Roubaix Gang,” and particularly 
a French convert and Bosnian war veteran named Lionel “Bilal” Dumont, serve as an eloquent example 
of this developing trend,116 which was not really noticed at that time.  
Indeed, the armed conflicts of the last decade of the 20th century, including those in  
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir, produced scores of professionally trained and battle-
hardened, violent converts to Islam. Many of those conflicts included direct or indirect participation by 
al Qaeda (AQ), and before 2001, AQ founded the Al-Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, which was used 
exclusively for military and terrorist training of non-Arabs, including converts.117  
Those converts who survived the fighting went back to Europe and North America, taking their 
violent philosophies and battle experience to migrant communities, which had been growing sharply 
during these same years. The rise in migrant 
communities, which occurred partly because of 
European liberal migration and asylum policies, also 
provided an expanding pool of Western converts to 
Islam, some of whom were inclined toward violence.  
Another factor influencing the rise of violent 
converts during this time period was an aggressive 
preaching of radical versions of Islam, projected and 
financially supported by certain religious circles and 
centers in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Arab states 
of the Gulf via forward outposts located in the West. This worldwide preaching campaign, waged 
everywhere from official mosques to correctional facilities, and aimed primarily at Muslims from 
migrant communities, also delivered a byproduct—Western converts to Islam, radicalized and ready to 
perform violent activities.  
All of these factors contributed to the initial development of violent Islamic converts as an 
integral part of the global jihad movement (GJM).118 Yet violent converts were still seen both by 
practitioners and scholars as an isolated and marginal phenomenon.  
 
                                                          
116 For more details on the Roubaix Gang, see: “Roubaix Gang,” Global Jihad, accessed June 21, 2010, 
http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1701. On Lionel Dumont, see Jim Frederick, “Japan’s Terror Threat,” Time.com, May 
31, 2004, accessed June 21, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,644220,00.html.  
117 Jeffrey Cozzens, “Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategies,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (online), February 1, 2005, 
http://www.janes.com/. 
118 In simple terms, I define the global jihad movement (GJM) as  loosely knit but strongly motivated, rooted in radical and politicized 
interpretations of the Muslim faith. The long-term goals of the GJM are vaguely defined and ultimately irrational. However, on the 
operational and tactical side the GJM is quite rational, a combination that makes the GJM a threat of  worldwide magnitude. The 
early organizational nucleus for GJM was Al-Qaeda (or Al-Qaeda Central), which struck a blow for GJM by launching the 9/11 attack. 
Currently, the GJM is based on loosely connected small groups, cells, and individuals that share radical Islamist ideology and a joint 
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In a stunning development, hundreds 
of Americans—citizens of the nation 
that had been the victim of the 
attack—converted to Islam within 
months after 9/11 
Since 9/11 
The 9/11 attack reshaped the entire global political-security landscape. When the World Trade 
Center towers collapsed, major paradigms decisively shifted. Foremost, it marked the beginning of a 
new stage of overt, broad confrontation of the GJM against the Western world. Among thousands of 
other things, it influenced the rapid evolution of violent Islamic converts. The high-visibility attack 
brought scores of already disgruntled or disenfranchised Westerners under the banner of radical Islam. 
 In a stunning development, hundreds of 
Americans—citizens of the nation that had been the 
victim of the attack—converted to Islam within months 
after 9/11, most likely to demonstrate disagreement with 
the public mainstream.119 For instance, several members 
of the “Toronto 18” terrorist group, which was dismantled 
in Canada in 2006, admitted after they were arrested that 
the 9/11 attacks captured their imagination and attracted 
them to Islam.120 The role of 9/11 as an enabler of 
conversion demonstrates how 2001 marks the beginning of the third generation of violent converts and 
how this generation is fully integrated into the GJM.  
Cases of Violent Converts 
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that, in the decade after 9/11, a growing number of 
violent Islamic converts have been considerably involved in terrorist acts. These converts are playing 
increasingly important roles as part of the GJM, making them a serious security threat in the context of 
terrorism in general and homegrown terrorism in particular.  
The United States 
Between 9/11 and June 30,  2010, 42 Islamist, terrorism-related plots and incidents took place 
or were foiled in the United States, according to my calculations.121 Violent converts were directly 
engaged in 26 of those 42 cases, almost 62 percent of the total. Converts operated in myriad ways—in 
cells, in pairs, as individuals, or as operatives of AQ or other terrorist groups. They performed or 
attempted to perform acts of direct violence, espionage, and conspiracy. Details of some of the cases 
are offered below. 
* Some violent converts operated within groups or cells of between four and 11 members. 
Roughly half of these cells were a combination of “native” Muslims and outside converts, including the 
                                                          
119 Brendan Bernhard, “White Muslim: From LA to New York … to Jihad” (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2006), 12. 
120 Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18,” The Star.com, June 22, 2010, accessed July 1, 2010, 
http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.html. 
121 Other sources report a different number of terrorist-related incidents. For examples of other estimates, see Jena Baker McNeill, 
James Carafano, and Jessica Zuckerman, “30 Terrorists Plots Foiled: How the System Worked,” The Heritage Foundation, April 29, 
2010, accessed May 13, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/30-Terrorist-Plots-Foiled-How-the-System-
Worked; Germain Difo, “Ordinary Measures, Extraordinary Results: An Assessment of Foiled Plots Since 9/11,” American Security 
Project, May 2010, accessed May 29, 2010, http://americansecurityproject.org/publications/2010/ordinary-measures-extraordinary-
results-an-assessment-of-foiled-plots-since-911/; and Bryan M. Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadi Terrorist 








One “gray area” case involved 
Michael Reynolds, a non-Muslim who 
offered his assistance to AQ but was 
motivated by something other than 
religion. 
“Portland 7” group, which had three converts out of seven members, and the “Virginia Jihad Network,” 
which had four converts out of 11 members. The “L.A. Prison” cell included three converts in a group of 
four and was also led by a convert, as was the “Raleigh Jihad” group, which included four converts out of 
eight members. Meanwhile, half of the examined cells consisted solely of converts, including the “Miami 
6” group, the “JFK Fuel Tanks 
Plot” cell, and the “New York 
Synagogue Plot” cell.  
* Some violent 
converts worked as part of a pair with one native Muslim; an example would be James Elshafay and 
Carlos Almonte. Other converts, such as Derrick Shareef and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad—the 
“Arkansas Shooter”—acted as a “lone wolf.” Still others, such as Michael Finton and Chris Paul, had 
formal ties but no clear operational links to any known terrorist structure.  One “gray area” case 
involved Michael Reynolds, a non-Muslim who offered his assistance to AQ but was motivated by 
something other than religion. All of these cases involved low-profile, amateurish, terrorist intentions 
and activities that were localized within the U.S. 
* In at least three cases, converts were chosen by AQ-affiliated leaders to plan or execute high-
profile, mass-casualty attacks in the U.S. or against U.S. targets. These cases involved Richard Reid, Jose 
Padilla, and Diren Baroth and included plots to use an 
improvised explosive device against an airborne jetliner and 
to disperse radiological contaminants in an urban 
environment. 
* Two episodes involved converts attempting to 
provide classified information to AQ recipients. Both 
converts were serving in the U.S. military at the time; Ryan 
Anderson was in the U.S. Army National Guard, and Paul 
Hall, also known as Hassan Abu Jihaad, was in the Navy. 
* In another military-related case, Hassan Akbar, a 
U.S. Army sergeant, was convicted and sentenced to death 
for killing two and wounding 14 others in an armed attack 
against his unit members in Kuwait just after the U.S. invasion of Iraq began in 2003. In his trial, both 
defense and prosecution lawyers said that Akbar wanted to keep troops from killing his fellow 
Muslims.122 
* Two American women converts, Coleen LaRose and Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, conspired within a 
wider group to kill a Swedish cartoonist for alleged blasphemy.  
* Several U.S. converts, including Omar Hammami, Bryant Vinas, and Daniel Joseph Maldonaldo, 
were involved in direct fighting in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Somalia, that included battles 
against other Americans. At least one convert, Adam Yahye Ghaddan, was engaged in a sophisticated 
                                                          
122 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Army Soldier Is Convicted In Attack on Fellow Troops,” Washington Post.com, April 22, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7210-2005Apr21.html. 
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Although these cases share certain 
similarities with those in the U.S., 
they also bring differences to light. 
strategic communication campaign conducted by AQ. A 
recently detained convert, Barry Bujol, Jr.,  allegedly 
provided materiel support to AQ. 
* Not included in my count of terrorist incidents 
involving converts were incidents revealed in the second 
half of 2010 and the first half of 2011, including the cases 
of Antonio Martinez, accused of plotting a terrorist attack 
against a military recruitment station; Zachary Adam 
Chesser and Jesse Curtis Morton, who allegedly issued 
death threats against the creators of “South Park”; and Joseph Anthony Davis (Abu Khalid Abdul Latif) 
and Frederick Domingue Jr. (Walli Mujahidh), who are suspected of plotting an attack against the 
military recruitment facility in Seattle. In addition, Lance Corp. Yonathan Melaku from the U.S. Marine 
Corps Reserve was arrested in the vicinity of the Pentagon in June 2011 with explosives in his backpack; 
he most likely is also a convert to Islam. 
All of these cases illustrate the wide range of individuals, activities, and operational patterns 
that link the actions of American converts to homegrown terrorism and  the global jihadist movement. It 
is also important to keep in mind that this is just the tip of the iceberg; these are cases publicly revealed 
after the perpetrators had been apprehended. Presumably, many more converts who may be prone to 
violence are on law enforcement watch lists.   
Other Western Countries 
In Europe, converts have been part of most of the major known terrorist plots and associated 
networks that have come to light since 9/11. It is hard to find a country on the European continent, from 
Spain to Norway, where violent converts did not leave footprints. Violent converts have also been linked 
to terrorist-related activities in Canada and Australia. Some examples are listed below.123 
* A British–Jamaican convert, Germain Lindsay, was one of four suicide bombers who conducted 
the 7/7 attack on the London Underground in 2005. 
* Spanish convert Jose Luis Galan Gonzales (Yousuf Galan) was a member of a jihadist logistic 
recruitment ring linked to the 9/11 hijackers. Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras supplied 110 kilograms of 
stolen explosives to terrorists who 
launched the 3/11 attack on the Madrid 
mass transit system in 2004.124   
* A Belgian convert, Muriel 
Degauge, became the first-ever European female suicide bomber. She died in the attack in Iraq in 
November 2005. 
                                                          
123 All data below is compiled from information produced by different news agencies between 2001 and the present. 
124 Christopher Jasparro, “Madrid Attack Points to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 2004), 31. The 
conversion of Trashorras to Islam is still disputed though by those who argue he was involved in the conspiracy purely as a criminal 
seeking profit. 
In Europe, converts have been part of most of the major 
known terrorist plots and associated networks that have 
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* A German–Polish convert, Christian Gancharzski, was affiliated with AQ and a mastermind of 
the April 2002 terrorist attack in Djerba, Tunisia, which left 14 German tourists dead. 
* Two of the four members of the Sauerland cell in Germany, which planned a mass-casualty 
attack against German civilian and U.S. military targets, were homegrown converts. 
* Three converts were among the 24 people detained as conspirators in the “liquid explosive 
plot,” which  means 12.5 percent of the people involved were converts. This operation aimed to destroy 
trans-Atlantic jetliners in summer 2006.  
* At least three of 19 members (15.8 percent) of the Hofstaad Islamist terrorist network in the 
Netherlands that killed filmmaker Teo van Gogh were ethnic Dutch converts. The number might be even 
higher if converts in the group’s outer circle are included in the count. The network’s second-in-
command, Jason Walters, was a convert of Dutch–American descent. 
* At least four members of the “Toronto 18” (22.2 percent) terrorist network in Canada were 
converts.  
* Between 2002 and 2006, Australia experienced eight criminal cases related to terrorist 
activities committed by converts. Included in that count are a female convert’s preparation for an attack 
with an explosive device; a convert’s participation in a grassroots, self-radicalized cell; and four cases of 
converts cooperating with foreign terrorist networks.   
Many more examples could be provided, but this list demonstrates both the scope of the 
problem and its diverse patterns. Although these cases share certain similarities with those in the 
U.S., they also bring differences to light.  
The major factor influencing differences between Islamic converts and their rapid radicalization 
in the United States and Western Europe is the existence of massive, not-fully-integrated Muslim 
migrant communities steadily growing across the European Continent. Those communities—with their 
extensive social relations and associated web of mosques, Islamic centers, and clubs—attract 
nonimmigrant Europeans, particularly those who experience certain problems of alienation or who feel 
the need for spiritual guidance or social kinship, or who wish to change their  way of life. (These ideas 
will be discussed in more detail below.) The existence of large Muslim communities creates an 
environment hospitable to conversion, and in many cases, subsequent radicalization of those converts. 
According to some estimates, more than 400 (about eight percent) of the nearly 5,000 confirmed Salafi 
Muslim extremists put under police surveillance in France were “newborn” Muslims,125 grouped mostly 
around mosques and praying congregations. 
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Another factor that makes the role of Muslim converts unique in Western Europe is the 
geographic proximity of Europe to the Muslim world, in particular to the Middle East, the Gulf and south 
Asia. This proximity facilitates relatively easy access to those regions for the primary purposes of 
studying Islam and participating in armed jihad. The 2007 disclosure of the Sauerland cell  and the 
revelation of the existence of the “German Taliban” group operating in the lawless area of the Afghan–
Pakistani border in 2009126 were wake-up calls highlighting the real danger of  “exchanges” between  
convert cadres in Europe and the war zones. It is believed dozens of violent converts from Germany, 
Great Britain,127 Canada128 and other 
Western countries have joined the 
Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. Many of the surviving 
converts will return to their homes 
as battle-seasoned veterans, 
indoctrinated, and ready to act.  
Other Countries Worldwide 
 Violent converts are not an exclusively Western phenomenon. They may be found in many 
conflicts involving Islamist movements and organizations around the world. The most notable example is 
Russia, in the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus. Since the start of the Chechen war in 1994, 
hundreds of ethnic Russians and other Slavs, including military personnel, have converted to Islam and 
joined the ranks of the insurgency. (In some cases, the sequence of action was the opposite: they joined 
the insurgency and later converted to Islam). Details of some of the cases are listed below. 
* An analysis of search warrants issued by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs against 59 
individuals for their participation in the Chechen invasion into Dagestan in 1999 demonstrates that five 
of them (8.4 percent of the total) were ethnic Russians who were at least nominally Orthodox Christians 
prior to becoming converts to Islam.129  
* At least three of 32 terrorists (9.3 percent) who seized hostages in the Beslan school in Russia 
in September 2004 were converted ethnic Slavs. Among the converts was the group’s alleged leader, 
Vladimir Khodov.  
* A convert, Alexander Tikhomirov, (also known as Said Buryatski) was for more than two years 
a primary ideologue of the “Caucasus Emirate,” an umbrella for the constellation of the Islamist 
insurgent groups in the North Caucasus. The example of Tikhomirov, who was killed in March 2010, 
                                                          
126 Yassin Musharbash, Marcal Rosenbasch and Holger Stark, “The Third Generation: German Jihad Colonies Sprout Up in 
Waziristan,” Spiegel Online, April 5, 2010, accessed May 13, 2010, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,687306,00.html.   
127  “Pakistan: Two British Converts Killed in Drone Attack,” Islam in Europe, December 17, 2010, accessed March 4, 2011, 
http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2010/12/pakistan-two-british-converts-killed-in.html.  
128 “Canadians Enrolled for Jihad in Pakistan: Report,” NDTV.com, January 17, 2011, accessed June 6, 2011, 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/canadians-enrolled-for-jihad-in-Pakistan-report-79882. 
129 Based on data posted on February 12, 2001, on the website of the РОСИНФОРМЦЕНТР (The Russian Information Centre, 
http://www.infocentre.ru/, in Russian). That website is currently defunct. 
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Violent converts are not an exclusively 
Western phenomenon. 
indicates that converts are trusted enough be allowed to occupy high positions in the command 
hierarchy and act as authoritative sources of jihad ideology.130 
* Another notable convert, Pavel Kosolapov, a cadet who dropped out of the Russian Strategic 
Missile Forces’ Military Academy and joined the insurgency, allegedly has served as the mastermind 
behind several major terrorist attacks in mainland Russia.  
* Russian-Cossack convert Vitaly Razdobudko allegedly had a role in the January 2011 suicide 
terrorist attack in the Moscow airport. Two months later, Razdobudko committed a suicide attack 
against a police checkpoint in Dagestan together with his wife, Marina, also an ethnic Russian convert. 
Notably, Razdobudko was converted and indoctrinated by an imam who was also an ethnic Russian 
convert.131 
* Violent converts of Russian or Slav background were detected in several Islamist radicalized 
cells in mainland Russia, especially in Siberia and the Volga region, and in the ranks of Islamist groups in 
the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. The geographic reach of the Slav converts is widespread as is 
illustrated by the following cases: in 2005 a 
Belorussian citizen was arrested for his links to 
an Islamist cell in Spain; in 2007 a Russian 
convert was detained trying to cross the 
Pakistani-Afghani border disguised as a woman; 
and in the same year an 18-year-old Russian was 
apprehended by security forces in the camp of the violent Fatah al-Islam organization fighting against 
the government of Lebanon.  
In addition to the influence of the 15-year conflict in North Caucasus, other factors driving the 
high rate of violent conversion in Russia appear to be the post-Soviet ideology & identity vacuum, and 
frustration due to the ongoing severe economic crisis. These factors seem to have influenced many non-
Muslims to turn their attention to the “protest potential” of Islam. Although anecdotes such as the ones 
listed above are plentiful, it is difficult to assess the real role Russian converts play in Islamist activities in 
Eurasia because information released by official Russian sources makes it difficult to verify facts.  
Other remarkable examples of activities of violent Islamic converts are taken from three 
disparate regions of the world: 
* In the Philippines, the underground Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM), which is engaged in an 
urban insurgency against the government, includes several hundred converts, according to some 
estimates.132 RSM operatives are blamed for the worst incident in the history of maritime terrorism, a 
February 2004 arson attack aboard a ferry that claimed 116 lives.  
                                                          
130 Mairbek Vachagaev, “Killing of Said Buryatsky Unlikely to Deter North Caucasus Insurgency,” The Jamestown Foundation–Eurasia 
Daily Monitor 7, no 48, March 11, 2010, accessed March 17, 2010, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36146. 
131 “Moscow Airport Bomber Converted by Russian Imam: Report,” ABC-CBN News, January 28, 2011. 
132 “Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts,” The International Crisis Group, Asia Report #110, December 19, 
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…there is no universal portrait of violent 
converts. They are all different. 
* On the other side of the globe, in Trinidad and Tobago, the extremist organization Jamaat ul-
Muslimeen (JAM), consisting of African Caribbean converts, is engaged in a broad range of violent 
activities, from organized crime to political militancy, including an attempted armed coup.133 
* The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an insurgent group in Uganda, consists mostly of 
hardcore, violent converts to extreme Islam. Led by Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, the group fights against the 
government of this African nation.  
Summary 
It is safe to state that the cases detailed here display evidence of the rise of violent Islamic 
converts and their significant roles in both homegrown terrorism and the global jihad movement in the 
past decade. The vast reservoir of open source information makes it easy to find details of such cases. 
Harder to determine are the answers to three key questions arising from these findings: who are the 
converts?; why are they converted and radicalized?; and how does that process take place?  I turn my 
attention to those questions in the next section of the article. 
Patterns of Conversion 
This section does not examine broad 
dynamics and structural dimensions, instead it 
focuses exclusively on the individual level, 
which is crucial to understanding motivations 
behind violent conversion and attempts to map its trajectories. Such an understanding is relevant for 
assessing political and operational implications of violent Islamic conversions and for establishing 
effective countermeasures, such as profiling, counter-radicalization narratives, de-radicalization 
strategies, and others. Given the broad scope and complex nature of this segment, I will only highlight 
some key observations derived from my compilation of convert profiles.134 This section also examines 
the potential link between individuals with military backgrounds and conversion to violent Islamism. 
Who? 
The first discovery from the study: there is no universal portrait of violent converts. They are all 
different. A violent convert might come from any nation, race, age, social stratum, family background, or 
level of education. Such an individual might have had deep roots in any branch of Christianity, Judaism, 
Hinduism, or Buddhism; or  could have been only nominally religious; or  might have professed to be 
agnostic or an atheist. A violent convert might be a member of parliament and the ruling party, a 
wealthy businessman in his 50s, and a father of three adult children, as was Abdul Qader from Guyana, 
who conspired to blow up fuel tanks at the New York City international airport.135 Or, the convert could 
be a mentally disabled, uneducated, and unemployed 22-year-old, like Nicky Reilly from England, who 
                                                          
133 Chris Zambelis, “Jamaat al-Muslimeen: The Growth and Decline of Islamist Militancy in Trinidad and Tobago,” The Jamestown 
Foundation–Terrorism Monitor 7, no 23, July 30, 2009, accessed August 11, 2009, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35344/. 
134 I plan to reveal the unified profiles of violent converts in a future publication. 
135 For more about Abdul Qader’s profile and the fuel tank plot, see Gordon French, “Guyana ‘Shocked’ by Terror Plot to Blow Up JFK 
Airport,” Caribbean Net News, June 4, 2007, accessed January 19, 2009, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/news-1867/13-13.html. 
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… a careful investigation of personal 
profiles of violent converts does reveal a 
common characteristic evident in most: 
a crisis in their lives before  
their conversions. 
detonated an explosive device in the shopping mall in his hometown.136 These two examples 
demonstrate the range among  converts comprising this pool.  
Yet a careful investigation of personal profiles of violent converts does reveal a common 
characteristic evident in most: a crisis in their lives before their conversions. The problems causing this 
crisis might be psychological, personal, social, or of a combined nature. But whatever the source of the 
problem, the individuals came to see conversion to Islam as a remedial solution to their troublesome life 
experiences.137 In simple terms, the pre-conversion crisis creates a trigger factor leading to conversion. 
Such a move marks the first stage of the conversion-radicalization-activation (CRA) loop. 
Several examples of violent converts illustrate this idea. For instance, all three of the most 
notorious German convert jihadists—Fritz Gelowicz, Daniel Schneider, and Eric Breinninger—came from 
dysfunctional families, and their parents all divorced when the trio were in their early teens. Muriel 
Deagauge, a Belgian convert “she-bomber,” had experienced both sudden and persistent life crises. Her 
brother died in a motorbike accident; she had been perpetually employed in low-income jobs; she 
experienced bad relations with her parents; and she was twice divorced. In these cases, as in most of the 
others,  life crises  drove the individuals to seek a 
solution that eventually led them toward conversion 
to radical Islam.  
Life crises can make individuals who are 
suffering feel disenchanted, frustrated, alienated, or 
marginalized. Individuals who are reluctant to blame 
themselves for the problems will instead— 
consciously or not—often blame their environment, 
including their society and state, and fellow citizens 
who are doing well. Anger generated from these 
thoughts moves the disgruntled and disenfranchised 
individuals closer to conversion and to radical interpretations of Islam, allowing them to more quickly 
bridge the gap between conversion and radicalization inside the CRA loop.  
Why? 
 This begs the relevant question: why do some individuals opt for conversion to Islam to curb 
their problems? Below are several reasons someone might choose this path, listed in no particular 
order.  
Simplicity. Compared with other religions, Islam is characterized by the simplest and shortest 
conversion procedure. To become a full-fledged Muslim, a neophyte should vocally articulate a shahada 
statement: “La Illahi illa’Llah wa-Muhammad ar-Rasool l-Llah,” or “No God except God, and Muhammad 
is his Prophet."  This must be verified by two Muslims. 
                                                          
136 “Nicky Reilly: Profile of a Failed Suicide Bomber,” Metro.co.uk, October 15, 2008, accessed November 8, 2008, 
http://www.metro.co.uk/news/357902-nicky-reilly-profile-of-a-failed-suicide-bomber. 
137 Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the main electoral slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is Al-Islam huwa al-Hall or Islam 
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Guidance. Islam provides a detailed but simple map both for daily life and for dealing with 
contingencies. A strict list of prohibitions (clear “can” and “can’t” guidelines) suits many, which is 
another facet of the ease in converting to Islam.  
  Identity. What is sometimes referred to as the “post-modern ideas crisis,” is sometimes 
associated with “losing confidence in the Christian vision.”138 Actually, this is not a new phenomenon: 
the notion of Gott ist Tot (God is dead) was a concept put forth by Friedrich Nietzsche as early as 1882. A 
decline in Christianity and a widening spiritual void results in the deteriorating of identity for at least 
some Westerners. Seeking identity and feeling “a need to belong”139 may eventually lead them toward 
Islam. As explained by Yvonne Ridley, a British journalist who converted to Islam while in Taliban 
captivity and became a fierce critic of the West, she chose to become a part of “the best and biggest 
family in the world”140 (i.e., Muslim ummah).   
Protest. In the current global political environment, radical interpretations of Islam are serving 
as an “outlet of rebellion”141 against the existing order and realities. This draws a striking parallel with 
the period of the Cold War when 
disappointed Westerners, especially 
young people,  turned toward radical 
leftist ideology. In other words, 
according to Khosrokhavar, “some of 
the converts believe in the utopian 
role of Islam in the same fashion as the 
middle-class leftist youth in the 1960s 
and 1970s believed in Marxism or communism. Islamic terrorism partially feeds on the exhaustion of 
leftist ideologies that mobilized part of the youth in Europe.…”142 The potential of radical Islam as a tool 
of anti-establishment, anti-state and anti-societal defiance and militancy143 remains one of the most 
common causes of conversion among the profiled violent converts. 
                                                          
138 Michael Nazir-Ali, “Extremism Flourished as UK Lost Christianity,” The Telegraph, January 7, 2008, accessed October 15, 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1574695/Extremism-flourished-as-UK-lost-Christianity.html. For more on this subject, 
see: “Islamic Radicalism in Europe Reflects Spiritual Void,” Islam in Europe, September 16, 2007, accessed May 23, 2008, 
http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/search/label/Converts?updated-max=2007-10-25T08%3A10%3A00-07%3A00&max-results=20. 
139 The “need to belong” concept is elaborated by a French–Lebanese philosopher, Amin Maalouf. See Amin Maalouf and Barbara 
Bray, In the Name of Identity: Violence and a Need to Belong (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001). 
140 Hannah Bayman, “Yvonne Ridley: From Captive to Convert,” BBC News, September 21, 2004, accessed September 20, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/3673730.stm.  
141 Jumana Farouky, “Allah’s Recruits,” Time.com, August 20, 2006, accessed November 29, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1229125,00.html. 
142 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Jihadism in Europe and the Middle East,” 37. 
143 Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan, Terrorism in Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 119. 
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In the current global political 
environment, radical interpretations of 
Islam are serving as an                   
“outlet of rebellion” against the 
existing order   and realities. 
Ego. Adventurism, machismo, and a need to overcome an inferiority complex lead some 
personalities—primarily young men with no bright life prospects—to drift toward radical Islam, where 
they can find a whole variety of benefits: new likeminded friends, self-confidence, a feeling of 
superiority toward “ordinary” fellow citizens, and an adrenaline rush. As noted by Olivier Roy, a 
prominent scholar in the field of political Islam and Islamism, “they (converts) are people who feel 
devalued, despised and by becoming terrorists they suddenly become supermen, heroes.”144 Not 
surprisingly, the conflict areas in the Muslim world, such as Afghanistan, Waziristan, Kashmir, Chechnya, 
Bosnia, Iraq or Somalia, serve as a magnet for young 
and disenfranchised converts. 
This set of reasons, drivers, and motivations is 
obviously incomplete and illustrates only some of many 
possible variations, ranging from technical to spiritual. 
Any examination of motivations for conversion should 
include such issues as resistance, revenge, grievances, 
propensity to violence, cultural influences, personal 
relationships, and many others, but the limited scope of 
this article must leave more detailed analysis for the 
future. Again, what is important to note is that it is 
impossible to establish a universal motivational pattern 
for conversion to radical Islam. In the words of Gen. Wesley Clark, answering a CNN anchor’s question 
about why a U.S. soldier who was a convert to Islam assaulted his fellow servicemen in Iraq in March 
2003, “you can't imagine what the motivation could be. What could he be thinking?"145 
 How? 
 There are multiple ways people convert to Islam and move into violence. Each convert has his 
or her own unique conversion and radicalization trajectory, yet it is still possible to identify some the 
most common paths and tools that enable such a conversion.  
The Internet. Tools such as email, chat rooms, Facebook and other social networks, blogs, and 
websites are huge enablers of conversion and radicalization (C&R), providing access to sources of 
knowledge, indoctrination, and guidance—not to mention contact with likeminded believers. This last 
point is crucially important, since contacts are often used to “hook” recruits. An absence of direct 
physical contact  can help create an initially friendly environment that emboldens neophytes who 
otherwise might abstain from certain decisions.146 Two early American jihadist converts, John Walker 
Lindh and Adam Yahee Ghadan, started their C&R trajectory through the Internet.  
Mosques. Preaching facilities and congregation communities controlled by radical imams have 
produced hundreds of radical converts in Europe and the United States. Affiliation with such hubs 
                                                          
144 Cited from Grim’s Hall blog, October 31, 2005, accessed March 3, 2010, 
http://grimbeorn.blogspot.com/2005_10_01.archive.html. 
145 “101st Attack: The Investigation,” CNN.com, March 24, 2003, accessed October 31, 2009, http://www-
cgi.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0303/24/se.06.html. 
146 For more details on jihadist recruitment via the Internet, see Daniel Williams, “Terrorists Seek Next ‘Jihad Jane’ on English-
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becomes a starting point for C&R. For instance, two French brothers, Jerome and David Courtallier, 
converted and radicalized in the Brighton mosque in the United Kingdom. They later plotted an attack 
against the American Embassy in Paris in 2001.147 Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider of the Sauerland 
cell attended radical gatherings in the notorious Multikulturhaus center in Neu-Ulm, Germany.148 
Mosques and similar facilities are very attractive to alienated and disgruntled Western Islam neophytes. 
  Relationships. Personal relationships can be enablers of C&R. Many future converts learned a 
radical version of Islam through contacts with “native” Muslims, including people they met in school or 
college; on sports teams or fitness clubs;149 or through other common interests, to include friends, 
marriage, or other partnerships and relationships. Germaine Lindsay, a 7/7 suicide bomber, was 
converted and radicalized by his ethnic Pakistani schoolmates. By the same token, Russian convert Pavel 
Kosolapov learned radical Islam from his Chechen neighborhood  friends. Jason Walters from the 
Hofstaad network was converted by his convert father and then became radicalized through Moroccan 
friends, eventually converting his younger brother, who also joined the network. Many violent converts, 
such as Jack Roche from Australia and Willie Brigitte from France, converted first due to their marriage 
to Muslim women (a mandatory step to formalize relations in accordance with Islamic tradition), and 
then radicalized. Some female converts, like Jill Courtney from Australia and Egle Kusaite from Lithuania, 
were converted and rapidly radicalized by their Muslim boyfriends.  
Travel and study. Examination of convert profiles indicates that some were converted during 
travels to the Middle East or South Asia. A trip that often began with natural curiosity about another 
country, culture, and traditions eventually led to conversion. Problems came when the conversion stage 
was rapidly altered by radicalization after the “newborn” Muslims turned to education in the religious 
schools (madrassa) controlled by radical Islamist centers throughout Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the 
Gulf, and Pakistan. American convert Carlos Leon Bledsoe, also known as Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad, began shooting at a U.S. Army recruitment center in Arkansas, killing one person and 
injuring another, shortly after completing a brainwashing study in a Yemeni madrassa.150  
 Incarceration. Prison conversion and radicalization is increasingly being recognized as a real 
problem.151 Muslim inmates constitute a substantial portion of the European prison population: for 
instance, in the United Kingdom, Muslims make up about 11 percent as of 2008.152 Many correctional 
                                                          
147 An initial motivation for conversion of both brothers was to curb drugs addictions. When visiting a mosque, they were hooked 
and consequently indoctrinated. For details, see: Anthony Barnett, Martin Bright, and Nick Paton Walsh, “UK Student’s ‘Key Terror 
Role’,” The Guardian, October 28, 2001, accessed September 18, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/28/terrorism.uk. 
148 Roland Strobele, “Southern German Towns Become Hub of Jihadism,” World Politics Review, September 17, 2007, 
httrp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1142/southern-german-towns-become-hub-of-jihadism (accessed March 28, 2008). 
149 Scott Atran, “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?,” Perspective on Terrorism, 2, no. 5: (2008) 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/35/html. 
150 Joseph Abrams, “Little Rock Shooting Suspect Joins Growing List of Muslim Converts Accused of Targeting U.S.,” Fox News, June 2, 
2009, accessed June 3, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,524799,00.html. 
151 For in-depth analysis of prisons as fertile grounds for conversion, see “Recruitment and Mobilization for the Islamist Militant 
Movement in Europe,” The European Commission, December 2007, accessed June 16, 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/docs/ec_radicalization_study _on_mobilization_tactics_en.pdf,  39-44. 
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Historically, expeditionary warfare and 
other forms of overseas operations in 
Islamic-dominated lands resulted in the 
conversion of some deployed personnel.  
facilities in Europe and the United States already have been called “radicalization incubators,”153 that 
are controlled by the radical Muslim gangs and visiting radical preachers who openly proselytize 
Islamism. Many experts believe that prison’s confined environment and “captive audience” make non-
Muslim inmates, especially those who want to break the cycle of their criminal history, more 
psychologically susceptible to conversion offers.154 Richard Reid, commonly known as the “Shoe-
Bomber,” was converted and radicalized behind bars.  Two American homegrown terrorist cells 
consisting of converts, the L.A. Prison Cell and the 
Synagogue plot group, originated from prison.155  
 
Military Backgrounds and Violent Conversion 
It is hard to establish a definite link between 
military service and conversion to violent strains of 
Islam. However, certain violent converts definitely 
were influenced by their military experience, which 
played a vital role in their conversion and 
radicalization  trajectories, whether radicalization 
came before or after conversion. Table 1 lists some 
potential attitudes and motivations specific to individuals with active or past military service, and shows 
how they might influence C&R.  
Historically, expeditionary warfare and other forms of overseas operations in Islamic-dominated 
lands resulted in the conversion of some deployed personnel. For instance, French General Jacques-
Francois Menou, a commander of Napoleon’s troops in Egypt, converted to Islam upon his marriage to a 
local woman. Dozens of German officers with the Ottoman army during World War I converted as well. 
Russian experience in Afghanistan (1980s) and Chechnya (1990s) indicates dozens (if not hundreds) of 
servicemen not only converted, but also joined the other side.156 Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm led to military converts among military people once stationed in the Gulf. (Included in this group 
are John Allen Muhammad, who became the Beltway Sniper, and U.S. Army Capt. Josef  Yee, a Chinese-
American chaplain later accused of smuggling sensitive papers out of Guantanamo Bay.).  
The post-9/11 military operations in the United States' Central Command Area of Responsibility 
also produced scores of military converts from the United States and other countries. For example, in 
May 2004, 37 South Korean soldiers converted in Seoul’s mosque prior to their departure to Iraq. 
                                                          
153 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: New York City Police 
Department, 2007), 20. 
154 Ibid., 39. 
155For more information about the Synagogue plot group, see  Joseph Abrams, “Homegrown Terror Suspects Turned towards 
Radicalism in U.S. Prisons,” Fox News, May 22, 2009, accessed May 27, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,521215,00.html. 
156 There is a distinction in the patterns of conversion in Afghanistan and Chechnya. In the former case, most of those who converted 
were held in captivity by the mujahedin; the Russian military’s staunch ideology and tough security control provided sufficient 
safeguards to prevent conversion via interaction with the local population. In Chechnya, in addition to converts among prisoners of 
war, many soldiers converted and consequently switched sides via contacts with the Chechen population. The nature of the Chechen 
conflict, (“war among the people,” as Sir Rupert Smith puts it), with its geographical and linguistic proximity to mainland Russia to 
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Contributing to their conversion was apparently the training they received in language and culture in 
preparation of deployment.157 In another case, in July 2007, two American service members (a male and 
a female) stationed at Bagram Air Force Base  in Afghanistan converted to Islam and then married.158 By 
May 2005, there were four known cases of conversion in the American military in Iraq.159 One of these 
Muslim converts, Pvt. George Douglas, changed his name to Mujahid Mohammad and stated that one of 





Certain grievances and negative perceptions related to service in  military or civilian life 
(example: perceived bad treatment from superiors or fellow servicemen) might precipitate 
an individual to seek revenge. Islam offers potential for a person to partake in resistance 
and revenge, at all levels, from the global down to individual, particularly on an R&C track.   
Propensity to Violence  
and Adventurism 
It is believed that the nature and conditions of military service increase natural 
aggressiveness. Some individuals who served in the military  and were affected by its 
adventurism or became addicted to the adrenaline rush might trade sides after they leave 
military service. Violent jihad might also appeal to individuals seeking to appear more 
brave. These personality characteristics could also lead an individual to become a 
mercenary fighter. This is largely an R&C track too, as is the one above. 
Cultural Influence The nature of modern conflict, including the blurred lines between combat and military 
operations other than war (MOOTW), results in broad and diverse interaction between 
deployed troops and the local population. Such contact might result in the conversion of 
some personnel  who adopt the cultural environment they have been immersed in. Most 
such conversion cases are “normal”; however, some converts may radicalize eventually, 
depending on circumstances.  This is mostly a C&R track.  
Personal 
Relationships 
This is a subset of the previous category. Islam requires conversion of a non-Muslim 
partner in the case of marriage. Again, in some cases such a conversion may be an initial 
stage for radicalization. This is also a C&R track.  
Combination Most individuals who convert to Islam are responding to a combination of two or more of 
the patterns mentioned in this table. 
Table 1. Attitudes that Might Affect Military Veteran’s C&R 
Note: This matrix is incomplete and currently under further development. The causes shown in 
Table 1 are limited to the military pool only; beyond that domain, a much broader set of drivers 
and motivations can be found. 
                                                          
157 “South Korean Soldiers Convert to Islam before Iraq Tour,” The Daily Times (Pakistan), May 29, 2004, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_29-5-2004_pg7_43. 
158 “Two U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Convert to Islam - Paper,” Reuters, July 26, 2007, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-
28671120070726. 
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Douglas’s quote might be interpreted as 
sympathy for the Iraqi insurgency and indicates how 
easily a convert transcends from a purely religious 
sphere to a political one. The bottom line here is that 
protracted overseas campaigns in certain areas of the 
Islamic world will most likely lead to the conversion of 
some servicemen. And the concern is that certain 
individuals from within the pool of military converts 
may pass beyond mainstream, peaceful, legitimate, 
spiritual conversions into politicized, violent strains of 
Islam.   
My archive on violent converts to Islam 
indicates that a number of them had a military 
background.  Table 2 lists some violent Islamic 
converts and gives details of their military service and 
their involvement in terrorism.  
Given this record, it is safe to anticipate that jihadist ideologues will try to convert military 
members as a vehicle to undermine military morale, integrity, and cohesion. Zaghloul al-Naggar, one of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders, said proselytizing activities by his movement during the first 
Gulf War led to the Islamic conversion of “20,000 U.S. servicemen.”161 However irrational and 
exaggerated that claim, the statement clearly indicates the potential of propaganda targeting. The story 
of U.S. Army Spec. Bowe Bergdahl, who was forced to convert in Taliban captivity, also illustrates that 
militant Islamist leaders regard conversion both as a 
type of psychological operation tool as well as a 
strategic communication tool.162  
Conversion among military members is of 
concern because conversion to another religion in 
most cases involves an ultimate change of identity. 
Change of identity often results in a shift of loyalty. 
In the military, such a shift may have far-reaching 
implications for the system, particularly if the 




                                                          
161 “Egyptian Cleric Zaghloul Al-Naggar: Our Way of Dealing with US Military Is by Preaching Islam,” Middle East Media Research 
Institute, January 8, 2010, http://www.memritv.org/clip-transcript/en/2479.htm. 
162 In much broader terms, conversion to Islam is an inherent program point for many Islamist movements worldwide, such as the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT) and Tablighi Jamiat (TJ). In some places in the world, the conversion 
campaign by Islamists takes an overtly violent form, as is illustrated by the atrocities of the Boko Haram group in Nigeria. 
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Name (Nation) Military Service, Record Patterns of C&R/R&C and Nature of Violent Activity 
Lionel Dumont (France) Legionnaire in the French 
Foreign Legion, 13th Demi-
Brigade, Djibouti 
Converted while in real service. Fought in Bosnia on 
the Muslim side; led a terrorist-criminal gang in France 
in the 1990s; arrested in Japan in 2004. Believed to be 
a high-value AQ sleeper asset. 
Pavel Kosolapov (Russia) Cadet in the Strategic Missile 
Forces Academy, Rostov-na-
Dony; was discharged from 
grad course for alleged 
barracks larceny 
Was converted by Chechen friends upon his return 
after dishonorable discharge. Currently is believed to 
be a chief of the subversive service of the “Emirate of 
Caucasus” although no independent verification for 
that charge is available. 
Hiroshi Minami 
(Japan) 
MSgt in the 1st AB BDE, 
JGSDF 
Upon his retirement, decided to help “freedom-
fighters to resist government atrocities against 
civilians” in Chechnya. Was converted on the spot. 
Performed as a foot soldier. Missing in action, most 
likely killed in action. 
Matthew Stewart 
(Australia) 
Royal Australian Army, 
served in East Timor in 1999, 
2000. 
An obscure case. Most likely, converted due to cultural 
influences during his service overseas. Was displayed in 
some AQ/Islamist propaganda videos. Current 
whereabouts unknown. 
Willie Brigitte (France) Sailor drafted in the French 
Navy. Had a bad service 
record, deserted twice 
during his three-year term. 
Probably faced perceived 
racism during service due to 
his Afro-Caribbean origin. 
Pattern of conversion unclear, most likely came after 
service and via marriage (was married three times, all 
three times to Muslim women). Ended up as an 
operative of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, was detained in 
Australia for a terror plot, now serving terms in jail. 
Table 2. Military service converts who engaged in violence. 
Note 1: This list is being developed and law enforcement converts may be added. Yasin Abu Bakr, leader 
of Jamaat al-Muslimin in Trinidad and Tobago, served as a police officer. Martine van der Oever, a female 
member of the secondary ring of the Hofstaad network, was a police employee as well. 
Note 2: Some violent converts had no military service record, but came from military families. Daniel P. 
Boyd (the Raleigh jihad group) comes from a Marine officer’s family. Jason Walters (second-in-command 
of the Hofstaad) is a son of a former U.S. Air Force airman who served in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 
is a convert himself. Simon “Sulaymam” Keeler, a British jihadist activist, has a stepfather who is a 
serviceman or civil servant in the Royal Air Force.  
Note 3: U.S. converts are not listed here. However, notable U.S. violent converts with a military 
background include: Ryan Anderson, Paul Hall (. Hassan Abu Jihaad), Seyfullah Chapman and other 
associates from the Virginia Jihad Network; Hassan Karim Akbar (Mark Fidel Kloos); Bryant Neal Vinas 









Some other observations are relevant in the discussion of conversion and radicalization. The first 
is related to the factors that enable C&R. The first four of the five factors listed above (Internet, 
mosques, relationships, and travel and study) are obviously linked to globalization. Globalization, both in 
its technological and human dimensions, trumps geography, leading to intensifying interaction between 
civilizations. Air transportation squeezes physical distance, making travel take mere hours, instead of 
weeks and months as was needed in the not-so-distant past. The Internet makes communication even 
faster. 
  Migration changes demography. One does not necessarily need to travel away from Europe any 
longer to explore and contact another culture—it might be found next door or just around the corner, in 
the London suburbs, in the Paris banlieues, in Milan, or in the Hague. The openness of Western culture 
makes it easy for Muslims to proselytize others while Islam deflects penetration with strict and 
prohibitive safeguards.  
The “dark side” of globalization makes it important to assess the phenomenon of conversion in 
general and its violent dimension in particular. Increasingly, terrorist cases linked to converts illustrate 
the “globalized” nature of today’s world. The March 2010 “cartoon” plot involved a cell whose members 
originated from Algeria, Libya, the Palestinian territories, Croatia, and the United States; three of the 
seven detainees were converts; the cell was based on both sides of the Atlantic—in Ireland and the 
U.S.—and the cell’s target was a cartoonist in Sweden.163 In another example, Sergey Malyshev, an 
ethnic Russian convert from Belarus who fought in Chechnya on the rebels’ side, was arrested in 2005 in 
Spain for his role in a recruitment ring that consisted mostly of Pakistanis and was linked with the Iraqi 
insurgency.164 
A second observation has to do with the vague 
nexus between conversion and radicalization. As was noted 
by Jean-Louis Bruguiere, a French anti-terrorism judge, “the 
converts are undeniably the toughest. Nowadays the 
conversions happen more quickly and the commitment is 
more radical.”165 Michael Taarnby, an Islamist expert from 
the Danish Institute for International Studies, echoes him: 
“It's striking, the number of converts engaged in terrorist 
activities.”166 The question as to why some converts prefer 
extreme violent interpretations of Islam is one of the 
toughest to answer. Are they blindly lured and recruited, or 
do they cross the threshold voluntarily? Did they succumb 
                                                          
163 For details, see Jonathan Adams, “Jihad Jane and 7 Others Held in Plot to Kill Swedish Cartoonist,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
March 10, 2010, accessed March 12, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0310/Jihad-Jane-and-7-
others-held-in-plot-to-kill-Swedish-cartoonist.   
164 Hayder Mili, “Al-Qaeda Caucasian Foot Soldiers,” The Jamestown Foundation – Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 21, November 2, 2006, 
accessed October 12, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt-
news%5D=948&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1. 
165 Mark Trevalyan and Jon Boyle, “Al Qaeda Exploits ‘Blue-Eyed’ Muslim Converts,” New Zealand Herald, October 16, 2005, accessed 
June 14, 2009, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid+10350447.  
166 Ibid. 
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to peer-pressure, internal group dynamics, a leaders’ charisma? Or did they come to Islam already prone 
to hatred and violence, just comfortably embedding their rejection and prejudice in a  pre-existing 
extremist resistance ideology? Identifying the “missing link” that bridges the gap between conversion 
and radicalization leaves a broad field for future research.  
Summarizing this section, it is necessary to keep in mind that violent conversion is a very 
nonlinear, complex, and obscure process, as is illustrated by hundreds of personal stories. The 
centerpiece of each story, however, is a specific problem or problems suffered by an individual. The 
need to combat the problem causes a reaction, and conversion to Islam is viewed as a solution. In other 
words, at a certain point, existing long-term causes meet trigger factors, as in the classical 
“precondition–precipitance” equation by Martha Crenshaw.167 When conversion is offered in a package 
with radical ideology, it may lead “newborn” Muslims up a ladder of violent conversion. 
 Utility 
This section examines the value of violent converts in the global jihad movement (GJM). . It also 
touches briefly upon two related aspects associated with converts, their role in the so-called “war of 
ideas” and female suicide terrorism.  
Value 
  Understanding the place and role of violent converts in the context of homegrown terrorism 
underlines their multiple levels of utility for the global jihad movement. This utility, which is both 
practical and symbolic, may be broken down along several functional activity lines, as detailed below.  
 Direct action. This category includes straight involvement in terrorism, insurgency, and in 
some cases, associated organized crime. Converts may operate in the violent domain either as members 
of the ordinary rank and file (“muscle”) or as leaders. They might operate in their native environment 
(the West), conflict zones in the Muslim world, or elsewhere. The scale of their terrorist involvement 
may vary from high-profile to low-tech and amateurish. Converts involved in direct action include hand-
picked, high-profile AQ operatives (such as Lionel Dumont), “expendables” chosen for one high-visibility 
attack (like suicide bomber Germaine Lindsay), “foot soldiers” fighting in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
region, or homegrown jihad wannabes who try to commit mostly low-tech attacks in their homeland. 
Several examples of all kinds of these activities have been discussed in this article. In addition, a selected 
specific segment—female suicide terrorism—is examined in more detail later in this section.  
Ideological support for terrorism. This domain encompasses converts involved in different 
forms of justification or defense of Islamist terrorism and violent extremism. This support may include 
participation in Islamist propaganda efforts, proselytism, recruitment and indoctrination of new 
followers, and related activities. One notable example of an individual engaged in ideological support of 
terrorism is Trevor William Forest, or Abdullah al-Faisal, a British–Jamaican convert imam, who preached 
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religious and racial hatred across the U.K. Muslim community, until he was legally banned.168 The role of 
converts in the “war of ideas” is elaborated further in this chapter. 
Materiel support for terrorism. Many converts have been accused of being engaged in 
different forms of material and technical support in the context of the GJM, such as fundraising, 
providing supplies, and sharing expertise. For example, Raphael Gendron, an ethnic French convert and 
information technology specialist, was maintaining a website of the Malika al-Aroud Islamist network, 
which was used for jihadist propaganda and recruitment.169 Some converts are active in Islamic 
charities, which are controlled by the radical centers. 
Intelligence Support. Another way converts contribute to the movement is through “classic” 
espionage. As was mentioned earlier in this article, two U.S. servicemen were convicted this decade for 
their attempt to act as AQ “moles.” Another example of how converts may be used for spying is Madhuri 
Gupta, an Indian diplomatic service employee in Islamabad, who allegedly was recruited by the Pakistani 
intelligence services.170 
Structural Dimension 
 In recent decades, converts have been spotted in the ranks or outer circles of major terrorist, 
insurgent, political extremist, and criminal groups. These groups include AQ, the Taliban (both in its 
Afghani and Pakistani branches), Jemaah Islamiyeh, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the 
Moroccan Combat Islamic Group, Al-Shabab in Somalia, and People against Gangsterism and Drugs in 
South Africa. Converts were also identified in different elements of insurgencies in Iraq, Kashmir, 
Chechnya, and the Niger Delta. Only two organizations with more than 100 members are known to 
consist solely of converts—the RSM in the Philippines and the JAM in Trinidad and Tobago. Otherwise, 
violent converts were embedded in small numbers into groups made up mostly of “native” Muslims. 
However, even at  the lowest organizational levels, the convert-related structural dynamic is 
disturbing. Violent converts  increasingly represent a substantial percentage of members in grassroots, 
self-radicalized, autonomous cells and groups scattered across the Western urban environment. Most of 
these structural units are an amalgam, i.e. consisting of “native” and convert Muslims. However, some 
are made up exclusively of converts (such as the “Miami Six” or “Synagogue plot” groups). To further 
complicate the landscape, many violent converts demonstrate their willingness and ability to operate as 
“lone wolves” without formal affiliation with any group. Such a dynamic poses obvious implications for 
Western security services and law-enforcement agencies.  
Operational Dimension 
Small groups and loners embedded into increasingly multicultural, diverse, and fluid Western 
communities are not easily distinguished from moderate Muslims. That difficulty poses a key security 
challenge from the standpoint of profiling, detecting, penetrating, and dismantling terrorist groups. This 
fact was openly discussed by Dennis Blair, then the director of U.S. National Intelligence, and Robert 
                                                          
168 Margaret Ryan, “Cleric Preached Racist Views,” BBC, February 24, 2003, accessed May 3, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2784591.stm. 
169 “Belgium: Al-Qaeda Cell Sentenced,” Islam in Europe blog, May 10, 2010, accessed June 5, 2010, 
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…it defeats Sun Tzu’s 
paradigm of penetrating the intent 
of the enemy’s army commander. 
Instead of an army, there are 
hundreds of decentralized 
“platoons”…well-blended into their 
environment. 
Mueller, the Director of the FBI.171 Such scattered and low-key groups of likeminded and “action-
oriented friends”172 with an unpredictable internal dynamic, no formal hierarchy, and loose outside 
connections are a real concern for security efforts. If such cells keep a low profile and look and behave 
“traditionally,” they produce few warning indicators prior to an act of terrorism. An example of such a 
low-profile group that blended into its community is the 7/7 terror cell, which consisted of three 
members of Pakistani descent and a convert.  
The current threat from such small groups in some 
ways is comparable to the challenge of  sleeper cells of the 
Cold War period, and trumps the meaning of strategic 
intelligence in combating terrorism. Equally, it defeats Sun 
Tzu’s paradigm of penetrating the intent of the enemy’s 
army commander. Instead of an army, there are hundreds 
of decentralized “platoons” (groups, cells and lone wolves), 
well-blended into their environment. The threat posed by 
“white-skinned, blue-eyed, hard-to-detect” converts (a 
dream of the late terrorist Abu Mus’ab al-Zarkawi)173 in 
such an environment grows even greater.   
Female Suicide Terrorism  
The use of women as suicide bombers is not unique in the context of Islamist terrorism; women 
have been used in Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Chechnya, Russia, and other areas. However, the use of 
converts in this role is a relatively new, but potentially very dangerous trend. It is directly related to a 
steadily growing pool of Western women who are converting to violent interpretations of Islam. In 
spring 2010, two American female converts were detained for their alleged role in the “cartoon plot,” 
and an Australian woman was imprisoned in Yemen for her suspected ties to AQ in the Arabian 
Peninsula. One fear about this new use of female converts is that they will emerge as willing suicide 
executioners.  
As indicated as early as September 2005, “it is no longer if but when—when will we have 
Caucasian converts to Islam … American or Canadian female suicide bombers? It is only a matter of 
time.”174 This scary prediction materialized just two months later, when Muriel Degauge, the first known 
convert “she-bomber,” committed her attack. She was one of up to 47 female converts (most from 
Germany, Belgium, and Denmark) who reportedly were targeted by recruiters for suicide missions in 
                                                          
171 “Intel Chief: Small Groups are Key Terror Challenge,” CBS News, April 21, 2010, accessed May 31, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/21/ap/cabstatepent/main6419040.shtml; and “Home-Grown, Solo Terrorists as Bad as 
Al-Qaeda: FBI Chief,” AFP, April 15, 2010, accessed May 4, 2010, 
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172 Scott Atran, “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?  
173 Hayder Mili, “Al-Qaeda Caucasian Foot Soldiers.” 
174 Debra D. Zedalis, “Female Suicide Bombers,” 59-60, in Cindy D. Ness (ed.), Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility and 
Organization (London, New York: Routledge, 2008), and “Symposium: The She Bomber,” FrontPageMag.com, September 9, 2005, 
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Iraq and Pakistan.175 Although such reports could not be verified from independent sources, the 
alarming truth is that many women converts fall under the influence of radical Islamist ideology, 
subsequently becoming more susceptible to brainwashing, and eventually aimed at suicide missions. 
 A study of the profiles of Muriel Degauge and Egle Kusaite,176 another female convert who 
apparently had agreed to a suicide mission before she was arrested in Lithuania in 2009, reveals some 
striking parallels between 
the two women. Both 
experienced crises in their 
pre-conversion period. 
Both were converted and 
radicalized by their Muslim 
male partners. Neither had 
ever been to the Muslim world; their C&R stories took place entirely in Europe. Though Degauge 
eventually travelled to Iraq and detonated her explosive belt next to an American military convoy, she 
was the only victim of her attack. However, the next she-bomber may choose a less complex and much 
more effective method (from the standpoint of the media-political effect) and act in a crowded public 
place in a European city.  
War of Ideas 
 Analysis of the strategic communication projected by different segments of the GJM indicates 
its leaders increasingly appreciate the chance to exploit converts for their propaganda value. This is 
demonstrated by the frequency with which  converts appear in jihadist propaganda videos and Internet 
forums, and other tools of intelligence support. 
Converts are skillfully used by jihadist entrepreneurs to send messages to different Western 
target audiences. Adam Yahyee Ghadan, working for AQ, addresses primarily the American middle class, 
trying to turn it against the U.S. government’s foreign policy. For instance, his speech aired by Al-Jazeera 
in early October 2008 was devoted to an unfolding financial crisis in the United States. At the other end 
of the social spectrum, convert Eric Breinninger (before he was killed in Pakistan in April 2010) was 
messaging his peers among lower-class, disenfranchised, German youth urging them to join  the ranks of 
the Taliban. The media images of Breinninger, posing in military fatigues, traditional Arab scarf around 
his neck and a Kalashnikov rifle in his hands, created a very appealing message to those unstable “angry 
young men” back in Europe, who felt themselves alienated and deprived of life potential. In the same 
manner, U.S. convert Omar al-Hammammi (presumably killed in 2011) used to recruit disenfranchised 
young Americans, including Islam 
neophytes, to join fighting  the ranks 
of the al-Shabab Islamist movement 
in Somalia. 
                                                          
175 Karla Cunningham, “The Evolving Participation of Muslim Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi Movement,” 95, in 
Cindy D. Ness (ed.), Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility and Organization (London: Routledge, 2008). 
176 For more about Kusaite, see: “Potential Suicide Bomber Charged in Lithuania,” Baltic Report, May 4, 2010, accessed May 19, 
2010, http://balticsreport.com/?p=16608. 
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However, the propaganda utility of converts is not necessarily limited to  recruiting others for 
battle. Many converts are involved in “soft” propaganda and operate legally, both in public and on the 
Internet. One eloquent example is the above-mentioned British journalist, Yvonne Ridley. Her activities 
include waging a controversial political activism campaign for the release of the convicted AQ terrorist 
Aafia Siddiqi, praising Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev as a freedom fighter, and supporting the 
Kashmiri insurgency.177  
Suffice it to note that those providing intelligence support likewise represent a very diverse pool 
of characters, including hate-preaching imams, AQ “political officers” (like Ghaddan), drifters (like 
Ridley) and swingers. The latter are former far-left or far-right political activists who converted to Islam 
and joined the radical Islamists on the politico-propaganda front. Included in this group are Israeli leftist, 
pro-Palestinian activist Tali Fahima and former neo-Nazi leaders David Myatt and Ahmed Hubert (from 
the United Kingdom and Switzerland, respectively). 
As a final observation, the use of turncoat Westerners for propaganda purposes by GJM bears 
yet another resemblance to a Cold War pattern. The growing role of converts as high-value assets in the 
intelligence support field prompted EU officials to note the trend for the first time in 2010, when they 
stated: “Western converts are increasingly being used by Islamist terrorist groups for propaganda and 
recruitment purposes. Native speakers have appeared in videos produced by terrorist organizations and 
disseminated on the Internet, broadcasting messages to potential recruits in EU Member States in their 
own language.”178  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, it is important to underline the following key points relevant to violent converts to Islam.179  
Violent Muslim converts represent a rising trend and expanding subset within the domains of 
homegrown terrorism and  the global jihadist movement. This trend is indivisible from the entire issue 
of homegrown terrorism and should be treated as a “big threat within a great threat.” Converts create a 
“third element” of homegrown terrorism beyond radical, second-generation Muslims and legal and 
illegal Muslim, noncitizen migrants. 
Violent conversion is a multifaceted phenomenon without universal patterns for conversion and 
radicalization of its actors. The highly diverse and very individual internal motivations behind C&R 
represent the most complex segment of this phenomenon. 
From the operational standpoint, converts are difficult to detect, scattered, and hard to profile, 
and as such they pose a sustained security challenge.  
                                                          
177 Information about Ridley’s views and activities can be found on her webpage: http://www.yvonneridley.org. 
178 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report - TE-SAT 2010,” EUROPOL, 2010, accessed May 31, 2010, 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2010.pdf, 44. 
179 Some of these findings were reported by the author in the meetings of the Counterterrorism Working Group in Tbilisi, Georgia 
(April 2007) and Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (September 2007); and in the 12th Annual Conference of the Partnership for 
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…the role of converts is steadily 
increasing in intelligence support 
and propaganda efforts aimed at 
the Western public.   
Converts provide value for global jihad in the 
domains of operations, support, and propaganda. In 
particular, the role of converts is steadily increasing in 
intelligence support and propaganda efforts aimed at the 
Western public. Thus, converts are forming a promising 
potential recruitment pool and are regarded as an essential 
force multiplier by the entrepreneurs of global jihad. 
As the AQ core may further decline following the 
successful elimination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the center of gravity of the jihadist effort may 
shift even more toward the West and the homegrown terrorist pool that is gradually expanding there.  
The role of converts in terrorist activities is evolving. The next generation of violent converts is 
likely to be more action-oriented and consist mostly of young people, including scores of female 
converts. As a protracted, global, socio-economic crisis results in growing frustration in the West, the 
number of Western violent converts to Islam is likely to continue to rise. The problem may continue to 
gradually move from its previously peripheral position to the very epicenter of the homegrown 
terrorism domain. 
Violent converts should be clearly distinguished from moderates, who represent a majority of 
the converts to Islam and should not be treated with any prejudice. However, to combat the threat from 
violent converts effectively, first the threat should be recognized as such and properly identified. The 
political sensitivities and post-modern ethical values surrounding the issue of violent converts should 
not be allowed to stand in the 
way of developing effective 
strategies to counter this 
phenomenon. 
Being an indivisible part of homegrown terrorism, the  phenomenon of violent converts still 
requires special consideration from the standpoint of devising and employing proper counterterrorism 
policies and practices. To be countered effectively, the trend of rising numbers of violent converts still 
has to be studied and understood. In this regard, one of the most relevant ways to combat the problem 
is through scholarly research. This article represents an attempt to provide an initial overview of the 
problem, and is the first in a series of planned publications on violent converts to Islam. 
 
Jahangir Arasli works with the Partnership for Peace Consortium's Combating Terrorism Working Group 
(PfPCTWG).  A version of this article is slated for publication as a chapter of a forthcoming book titled 
"The Dangerous Landscape: Twenty-First Century Terrorism, Transnational Challenges, International 
Responses". Learn more about the CTWG and other CTFP affiliates on our Resources page. 
…post-modern ethical values surrounding the issue of violent 
converts should not be allowed to stand in the way of 
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There must be a transformational 
shift in the approach to how 
societies and governments manage 
those persons detained or 
imprisoned for terrorist offenses. 
Terrorist Rehabilitation: a Neglected Secret  CT Weapon  By Rohan Gunaratna 
 During the last decade, the global footprint of 
terrorism and ideological extremism has grown 
significantly.  Since al Qaeda attacked America’s most 
iconic landmarks on September 11, 2001, the US-led 
western response to terrorism has been overwhelmingly 
kinetic and lethal.  A review of terrorist attacks in the last 
decade indicates that the terrorist threat has only grown 
and not diminished.  
  It is time for the US, its allies, and their friends to 
evaluate the effectiveness of 
their kinetic and lethal strategies 
and craft a much more 
comprehensive approach.  This 
should include tackling both 
ideological extremism and its 
vicious byproduct, terrorism.  
Both proactively and reactively, 
those who participate, support 
and advocate terrorism need to 
be dissuaded from violence and  extremism, and guided 
to return to the mainstream.  To explain to them that al 
Qaeda and its associated groups are heretical and 
deviant, and not true to Islamic teachings, is the 
challenge.  This requires a multifaceted approach and an 
interagency mechanism where we work with a range of 
partners.  In addition to working with community 
institutions and the business sector, governments should 
work with educational and religious establishments, and 
the media, to engage Muslim communities.  
A New Approach 
There must be a transformational shift in the approach to 
how societies and governments manage those persons 
detained or imprisoned for terrorist offences.  Rather 
than warehousing , isolating or demonizing terrorist 
prisoners, governments should at least attempt to 
engage and rehabilitate incarcerated terrorists.  By 
working with them, not only can governments open the 
terrorists' minds, but they can also enable rehabilitated 
ex-terrorists to reach out to peers who may be at risk to 
radicalization.  Starting with immediate family and 
relatives, then moving to neighbors, friends, and even 
terrorist cells themselves, a former terrorist released 
from the custody of an effective rehabilitation program 
can influence hundreds.  By treating them with decency 
and counseling them to repent, express remorse, and 
understand and internalize moderate views, a safer and 
more just world can be built.  Otherwise, when released, 
those detained and imprisoned for terrorist and 
terrorism-support activity will harbor the same views as 
before, and continue the fight - 
possibly with even stronger 
inclinations to do so.  Unless 
governments invest in both 
community engagement and 
rehabilitation, the threat is likely 
to continue to grow.  
 To be effective, 
rehabilitation should be 
comprehensive.  Comprehensive 
rehabilitation can engage terrorists on several levels.  The 
modes of rehabilitation developed in the last decade 
include:  
 religious and spiritual;  
 educational and vocational;  
 psycho-social;  
 recreational;  
 social and familial; and,  
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Wherever terrorists or suspected 
terrorists are detained or 
imprisoned, rehabilitation should 
be made mandatory. 
 Such a multifaceted approach to rehabilitation 
can work only if there is an interagency mechanism 
whereby governments can work in partnership with their 
communities and private sector counterparts.  Although 
traditional rehabilitation starts 
from the point of capture and 
follows through to the point of 
release, rehabilitation will be 
most successful only if the 
released terrorist or beneficiary 
is further guided.  Following 
custodial rehabilitation, there 
should be a mandatory second 
phase to reintegrate the beneficiary back into the 
community.  Called "community rehabilitation", this re-
entry phase should include providing employment to the 
beneficiary, addressing other challenges of returning to 
the community, and continued guidance and counseling.  
The Evolution of Rehabilitation:  
Although rehabilitation for terrorists began in the 
1940s, the contemporary wave of rehabilitation started in 
the post 9-11 period.  Pre 9-11 programs included 
Greece, Malaya, Kenya, and Egypt.  Programs that 
emerged after 9-11 are the Saudi, Singaporean, 
Malaysian, Iraqi, Yemeni, Sri Lankan, Afghan, and Uzbek 
programs.  There are also ad hoc programs in India and 
Pakistan, as well as emerging programs in the U.K., 
Australia, Bangladesh, and in the Philippines.   
 Every rehabilitation program is unique, and every 
program can influence other programs.  On a visit to 
Saudi Arabia in early 2010, I learned that the Saudis have 
introduced the teaching of history to their terrorists in 
custody.  Because groups such as al Qaeda only permit 
their followers to read but a dozen books, the worldview 
of terrorist group leaders, members, and followers is 
often narrow.  In Islam, there are myriad books about 
math, science, literature, song, dance, and poetry.  
Islamic civilization has immensely contributed to the 
sciences, especially to medicine and astronomy.  To open 
the closed minds of terrorists in custody, it is important 
to share with them a more comprehensive range of 
knowledge.  Biblio-therapy is a new form of intervention 
in contemporary terrorist rehabilitation.  
 Although the focus of the world is on Muslim 
groups, rehabilitation works with 
non-Muslim groups as well.  For 
instance in Sri Lanka, an admirable 
rehabilitation program has been 
created since the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam was defeated in 
May 2009.  Largely funded by the 
business sector and community 
institutions, the government has 
released all those who are under 18, the disabled and 
most of the women.  The Sri Lankan rehabilitation 
program has received wide praise and appreciation from 
the international community.  
 Today, the challenge is to make terrorist 
rehabilitation a global imperative – that is, wherever 
terrorists or suspected terrorists are detained or 
imprisoned, rehabilitation should be made mandatory.   
 The United States of America missed a great 
opportunity to rehabilitate detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay.  Nonetheless, the US succeeded in building a highly 
successful program under the leadership of Major General 
Douglas Stone in Iraq. In Afghanistan, Stone’s blueprint was 
also followed by Vice Admiral Robert Harward.  
 Every terrorist in custody presents the respective 
government an opportunity to transform the terrorist's 
worldview.  But unless rehabilitation programs are built 
into every prison and detention centre, the vicious 
ideologies that drive terrorism will spread.  As the reverse of 
radicalization is rehabilitation, to prevent both radicalization 
and re-radicalization in prison, it is essential to invest in 
building rehabilitation intervention programs.  
Rehabilitation is a new and worthy frontier in the fight 
against terrorism.  
Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Head of 
the International Centre for Political Violence and 
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Restrepo: Produced by Sebastian 
Junger and Tim Hetherington (2010) 
 
The Moving Image Kalev I. Sepp 
RESTREPO Produced by Sebastian 
Junger and Tim Hetherington (2010)     
 There is a saying among 
soldiers, that combat is long hours of 
boredom, occasionally interrupted by 
moments of terror.  As true as this 
may be, it doesn’t mean that a 
wartime documentary should pattern 
its storyline in the same way.  Yet 
“Restrepo,” the true-life story of a 
U.S. Army infantry platoon fighting in 
the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan, 
manages to take what should be an 
intensely interesting subject – men at 
war in a distant, forbidding land, 
fighting a tough, elusive enemy – and 
make it somehow mundane.  For a 
military professional, its lessons call 
for patience and reflection. 
 Any criticism of “Restrepo” 
requires caution, for two reasons: the 
first is that the duly-celebrated 
filmmaker Tim Hetherington, who 
worked with the author Sebastian 
Junger to produce this film, was 
recently killed while filming the civil 
war in Libya in April 2011.  One does 
not wish to diminish Mr. 
Hetherington's lifetime of 
accomplishments and contributions 
by disparaging his last major project, 
and that is certainly not the intent.  
This review acknowledges his 
Sundance Film Festival prize for best 
documentary, his nomination for an 
Oscar award for “Restrepo,” the 
widespread acclaim from movie 
critics and ordinary moviegoers, and 
many other awards.  This 
commentary does not challenge the 
cinematic qualities of the film; rather, 
it addresses what value military and 
defense professionals might find in 
viewing this documentary. 
 The other reason to take care 
in analyzing “Restrepo” concerns 
what a noted American war 
correspondent has called the “cult of 
patriotism” in the United States.  In 
the decades following the painful end 
of the Vietnam War, Americans came 
to realize that the insults and attacks 
made by anti-war protesters against 
the individual soldiers sent to fight in 
Indochina were fundamentally wrong.  
The soldiers – both conscripts and 
volunteers – were only obeying the 
laws of the nation, and fulfilling their 
obligation as citizens.  The mature 
view now held by American society is 
that it is appropriate to criticize 
elected leaders and government 
officials for their policies, but not the 
troops who dutifully follow their 
orders.  However, some people have 
carried this outlook to an extreme: all 
soldiers, whatever their service or 
character, are “heroes,” and anything 
said of them or their conduct must be 
cast in terms of praise and honor.  
Anything less is "anti-soldier," and 
wholly unpatriotic.  This review 
recognizes their service and sacrifice 
– the film takes its title from the 
solitary outpost named for a fallen 
U.S. soldier, Private First Class Juan 
Restrepo – but considers if they are 
suited, as Americans, to the kind of 
war they have to fight. 
 If there is a benefit to 
watching “Restrepo,” it is to see one 
possible explanation why the United 
States armed forces had not 
succeeded by 2009 (when the filming 
was done) in overcoming the Taliban 
in the mountains and villages of 
Afghanistan.  The focus of the 
documentary – 2d Platoon, “B” 
Company, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry 
Regiment, of the 173d Airborne 
Brigade – is only one small unit, but in 
terms of the quality of its members, 
could be seen as a fair representation 
of the infantry platoons deployed to 
the war zone.  After almost eight 
years of counter-insurgency fighting, 
and declarations by analysts and 
senior commanders that the United 
States military had mastered this 
brand of warfare, there are disturbing 
scenarios that portray a different 
view. 
 Collectively, these incidents, 
played out in the film both in real-
time and in post-deployment 
interviews, reveal a unit isolated from 
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order to find and thwart the Taliban 
guerrillas.  Before arriving in the 
Korengal Valley, the company 
commander, an infantry captain, 
casually admits he didn’t study 
anything about the valley or its 
people – so as to arrive “with an open 
mind.”  He calls the rocky, tree-filled 
valley, reminiscent of the Sierras and 
the Rockies, “the ugliest place on 
earth.”  An American patrol passing 
though a village refuses the 
hospitality of a local man when he 
offers them chai (tea), and hurriedly 
marches on. 
  The American officers do 
meet with the village leaders, in 
weekly shuras.  The paratroop 
battalion commander visits once, to 
address the contentious issue of 
civilian casualties (the film shows 
destruction of homes by aerial 
bombing and attack helicopters, 
soldiers speaking of the women and 
children who have been wounded, 
and an Afghan man cradling a baby 
with fresh burn marks on its body).  
This colonel, wearing his body armor, 
speaks to the Afghan elders in 
English; not in sentences, but in 
lengthy paragraphs, without pausing 
for the interpreter.  He calls the 
Taliban “foreigners,” and says his 
captain will discuss job projects with 
them.  In another shura, the captain 
parlays with the same elders, and tells 
them in the same rapid English:  “… 
we can make more money, make you 
guys richer, make you guys more 
powerful.  What I need, though, is I 
need you to join with the 
government, you know, to provide 
you with that security, or help us 
provide you guys with that security.  
And I’ll flood this whole place with 
money and with projects and with 
healthcare and with everything.”  The 
dictum of the counter-insurgent to 
never over-promise, against the 
possibility of under-delivery, doesn’t 
seem to be the captain’s concern. 
 In a particularly telling scene, 
an Afghan man comes to Outpost 
Restrepo to ask for compensation for 
his dead cow.  The viewer comes to 
understand the grazing cow became 
entangled in the barbed wire around 
the small base, where the U.S. troops 
then killed, dressed, barbequed and 
ate it (“It was delicious,” recalls a 
soldier).  When the platoon consults 
their headquarters by radio, an officer 
is heard refusing to provide a new 
cow, or to pay a cash restitution.  
Instead, the voice on the radio offers 
an amount of rice, beans and sugar 
equal to the weight of the cow.  His 
face strained with frustration, the 
Afghan man repeats his claim for 
compensation, without success.  
Huge cargo helicopters fly 
overhead.  Troops exercise with 
gymnasium barbell sets, and practice 
driving golf balls from their bunker 
roofs.  One strums a guitar, others 
smoke and play videogames, and 
listen to rock music on portable 
stereos, while their meals are 
prepared on restaurant-size gas grills.  
No one is ever shown studying or 
practicing Pashtu. 
 There is no question, as the 
occasional combat footage in 
“Restrepo” plainly shows, that the 
American troops are competent and 
disciplined infantrymen.  They move 
quickly under the heavy load of their 
body armor and field gear, wear their 
kit properly, handle their weapons 
adeptly, and follow orders under fire.  
There are no cowards or shirkers to 
be seen.  Yet as the whole film 
reveals, this is not enough for 2d 
Platoon and “B” Company to prevail 
against the insurgents.  Mundane or 
not, watching “Restrepo” is 
worthwhile as an anecdotal study of 
one American unit and its leaders in 
combat, after the country that gave 
it its soldiers, and the Army that 
trained and deployed it, have been at 
war for almost a full decade.  In this 
regard, the film is a commendation 
for Sebastian Junger, and a fitting 
memorial to Tim Hetherington.  The 
limit of what the United States, and 
perhaps any nation, can achieve in a 
counter-insurgent struggle in a 
culture so different from its own, is 
the lesson of the battle for Outpost 
Restrepo.   
 
Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is senior lecturer in 
Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School.  He earned his 
Combat Infantryman Badge in the 
Salvadoran Civil War.
There are no cowards or shirkers to be seen. Yet as the whole 
film reveals, this is not enough for 2d Platoon and “B” Company to 
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CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS! 
The CT Exchange journal accepts submissions of nearly any type. 
Our aim is to distribute high quality international analyses, opinions, and reports to military officers, government 
officials, and security and academic professionals in the world of counterterrorism, and particularly, graduates of the 
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.  We give priority to non-typical, insightful submissions, and to topics 
concerning countries with the most pressing terrorism and CT issues.  CTFP graduates also receive priority consideration 
for submission of their work, although we accept submissions from anyone. 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 
CTX accepts the following types of submissions, and offers the following length guidelines: 
 academic analyses (5,000-7,000 words) 
 reports or insightful stories from the field (2,000 words) 
 photographic essays 
 video clips with explanation or narration 
 interviews with relevant figures (no longer than 15 minutes) 
 book reviews (500-1,000 words); review essays (1,000-3,000 words); or lists of books of interest (which may 
include books in other languages) 
 reports on any special projects 
 takeaways or reports of CTFP conferences, workshops, or events 
SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS  
Submissions to CTX must adhere to the following: 
 they must be copyedited for basic errors prior to submission; 
 citations should adhere to the Chicago style manual; 
 the work submitted may not be plagiarized in part or in whole;  
 you must have received consent from anyone whose pictures, videos, or statements you include in your work;   
 you must agree to our Copyright Disclaimer; 
 include a byline as you would like it to appear and a short bio as you would like it to appear (we may use either, 
or both); 
 include your name, CTFP programs you have attended, if any, and nationality (or, if you wish to be published 
anonymously, please contact the Managing Editor for more information) 
 
Any kind of submission can be multimedia.   
Submissions should be sent in original, workable format (in other words, we must be able to edit your work in the 
format in which you send it to us: no .PDF's please!) 
Submissions should be in English.  Because we seek  submissions from CTFP’s global community,  and especially look 
forward to work which will stir debate,  WE WILL NOT REJECT submissions outright simply because of poor written 
English.  However, we may ask you to have your submission re-edited before submitting again. 
READY TO SUBMIT?                                                      
By making a submission to CTX you are acknowledging that your submission adheres to all of the "SUBMISSION 
REQUIREMENTS" listed above, and that you agree to the CTX Terms of Copyright, so read them carefully.   
Once you have met the above requirements and agree to the Terms of Copyright, you may send your submission 
directly to: CTXSubmit@gmail.com 
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Resources: CTFP Institutions 
Each issue, we'll feature a list of recommended resources on a range of topics from 
radicalization to terrorist rehabilitation.  In this issue, we'll introduce you to the diverse CTFP 
institutions you can tap into as part of the CTFP network.  If you know of a notable resource 
worth sharing with the CT community through CTX, send your recommendation to 
CTXEditor@gmail.com with the word "Resources" in the subject line. 
 
 
Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) 
"Forging Partnerships for Africa's Future" 
AfricaCenter.org 
With a publicly accessible website, the Africa Center puts out 
a monthly eNewsletter, Africa Security Briefs, Special Reports, 
and academic Research Papers, such as the timely new piece 
on the grassroots evolution of the information environment, 
"Africa's Evolving Info Systems: A Pathway to Security and 
Stability".  Their dedicated alumni staff coordinate dozens of 
regional workshops and events throughout the year.  Go to 
AfricaCenter.org to connect. 
 
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) 
"Fifteen Years of Education, Empowering, and Connecting" 
APCSSLink.org 
Open to graduates of the Asia Pacific Center and affiliates, 
APCSSLink.org  "provides a forum ... to deepen your 
understanding of security issues, maintain existing 
relationships, and develop new contacts throughout the Asia 
Pacific region."  They offer APCSS Analytical Reports, News 
Briefs, and Currents Magazine, as well as specific 
Communities of Interest for security professionals in the 
region.  Go to APCSSLink.org to connect. 
 
College of International Security Affairs (CISA) 
"a focal point for interagency and international security 
education" 
www.NDU.edu/CISA 
CISA is the flagship of the Combating Terrorism Fellowship 
program at the National Defense University.  The Master's 
Degree program prepares military and civilian leaders from 
around the world "to better address national and 
international security challenges through multi-disciplinary 
educational programs, research, professional exchanges and 
outreach."  CISA's robust alumni website is available at 





Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) 
"Fighting terrorism is the ultimate civil-military challenge" 
www.CCMR.org 
CCMR is dedicated to strengthening democratic civil-military 
relationships and assisting other nations in making integrated 
defense decisions.  "Our most important objective is to help 
them build the institutional capacity to fight terrorism.  All 
programs include guidance on building national-level 
strategies that can guide effective, legal, and ethical 
operations against terrorists and their networks."  CCMR will 
be publishing a book, "Fighting Back: What Governments Can 
Do About Terrorism" later this year.  Find out more, and go to 
www.CCMR.org to connect. 
 
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) 
"toward a more cooperative and stable international security 
environment" 
www.NDU.edu/CHDS 
The CHDS mission is "to develop civilian specialists in defense 
and military matters by providing graduate level programs in 
defense planning and management, executive leadership, 
civilian-military relations and interagency operation." 
 
Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School (DA) 
"to educate the leaders of tomorrow in the challenges of 21st 
century conflict" 
www.NPS.edu 
DA's overarching missions is "to develop critical thinkers and 
capable operators, planners and commanders for the rigors 
of irregular warfare". They host joint SOF, conventional, and 
international officers and house the nationally prominent 
Information Operations Center of Excellence, and the CORE 
Lab.  More information is available through the Naval 
Postgraduate School website at www.nps.edu under the 
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Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) 
"exploring new ideas ... and acting as a catalyst for positive 
change" 
www.DIILS.org 
DIILS "is the lead defense security cooperation resource for 
professional legal education, training, and rule of law 
programs for international military and related civilians 
globally."  They also offer an alumni-only portal on the web.  
Go to www.DIILS.org to connect. 
 
GCMC (George C. Marshal Center) 
"enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of 
North America, Europe and Eurasia" 
www.MarshallCenter.org 
"The legacy, goals and ideals of the Marshall Plan continue 
through the security education initiatives of the George C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies."  The Marshall 
Center publishes its quarterly "per Concordiam" covering 
regional security and defense issues, in addition to publishing 
its renowned Occasional Papers, and Security Insights.  These 
are available freely at MarshallCenter.org, where alumni can 
also connect to their exclusive online portal, offering 
additional resources. 
 
JSOU (Joint Special Operations University) 
"fostering closer relationships with SOF’s international 
partners" 
JSOU.SOCOM.mil 
JSOU's mission is "to educate Special Operations Forces 
executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected 
other national and international security decision-makers, 
both military and civilian, through teaching, research, and 
outreach in the science and art of Joint Special Operations."  
Read through their recent publications and learn more about 
the University at jsou.socom.mil 
 
NAVSCIATTS (Naval Small Craft Instruction Advanced 
Technical Training School) 
"to provide partner nation security forces with the highest 
level of riverine and coastal craft training" Go to 
www.warboats.org/NAVSCIATTS.htm to connect.  
 National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) 
"to promote understanding of key transnational and 
geostrategic issues impacting the Intelligence Community" 
www.DIA.mil/College 
"...the Center for International Engagement co-hosts 
conferences and symposia on behalf of the Director, Defense 
Intelligence Agency. These events bring together Military 
Intelligence Chiefs to discuss regional security issues in an 
academic environment of non-attribution land transparency."  
Online, the NDIC offers unique publications on "Global 
Perspectives on Intelligence" and collaboration in the 
intelligence community, as well as insightful analyses.  Go to 
www.DIA.mil/College to connect. 
 
NESA (Near-East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies) 
"To enhance security in the Near East and South Asia by 
building sustained, mutually beneficial relationships..." 
NESA-Center.org 
"The NESA Center concept is based on the premise that Arabs 
and Israelis, Pakistanis and Indians and others  would come 
together in a neutral setting for mutually beneficial dialogue 
about national security issues. This concept has proven itself 
strong ..."  The publicly-accessible website offers regional 
news, as well as a comprehensive list of U.S. and international 
online resources freely available, in addition to their alumni-
only website.  Go to Nesa-Center.org to connect. 
 
PfPC CTWG (Partnership for Peace Consortium Combating 
Terrorism Working Group) 
"Strengthening democracies through knowledge" 
www.PfPConsortium.org 
"the Combating Terrorism Working Group brings together 
interested officials, security practitioners and academics from 
several countries to examine how best to design and apply 
multinational responses to current international terrorist 
threats."  The Partnership for Peace puts out a professional, 
quarterly journal, Connections, in addition to a number of 
other publication products.  To read their journal, go to 








ATTENTION: Alumni Staff, Leadership, and Faculty Would you like us to highlight particular activities or unique resources that your institution makes available to CTFP alumni?  Let us know at CTXEditor@gmail.com and we'll include that information in the next issue of CTX for all our readers.   
Strengthening your network is our mission. 
 
